Then there was the evidence of ocular fascination.  The accused and the accusers were brought into the presence of the examining magistrate, and the supposed witch was ordered to look upon the afflicted persons; instantly upon coming within the glance of her eye, they would scream out, and fall down as in a fit.  It was thought that an invisible and impalpable fluid darted from the eye of the witch, and penetrated the brain of the bewitched.  By bringing the witch so near that she could touch the afflicted persons with her hand, the malignant fluid was attracted back into her hand, and the sufferers recovered their senses.  It is singular to notice the curious resemblance between this opinion—­the joint product of superstition and imposture—­and the results to which modern science has led us in the discoveries of galvanism and animal electricity.  The doctrine of fascination maintained its hold upon the public credulity for a long time, and gave occasion to the phrase, still in familiar use among us, of “looking upon a person with an evil eye.”  Its advocates claimed, in its defence, the authority of the Cartesian philosophy; but it cannot be considered, in an age of science and reason, as having any better support than the rural superstition of Virgil’s simple shepherd, who thus complains of the condition of his emaciated flock:—­

                     “They look so thin,
    Their bones are barely covered with their skin. 
    What magic has bewitched the woolly dams? 
    And what ill eyes beheld the tender lambs?”

Witchcraft, in all ages and countries, was recognized as a reality, just as much as any of the facts of nature, or incidents to which mankind is liable.  By the laws of all nations, Catholic and Protestant alike, in the old country and in the new, it was treated as a capital offence, and classed with murder and other highest crimes, although regarded as of a deeper dye and blacker character than them all.  Indictments and trials of persons accused of it were not, therefore, considered as of any special interest, or as differing in any essential particulars from proceedings against any other description of offenders.  There had been many such proceedings in the American colonies,—­more, perhaps, than have come to our knowledge,—­previous to 1692.  They were not looked upon as sufficiently extraordinary to be transferred, from the oblivion sweeping like a perpetual deluge over the vast multitude of human experiences, to the ark of history, which rescues only a select few.  The following are the principal facts of this class of which we have information:—­