[136] In the following account of the process of belief and its errors, I am going over some of the ground traversed by my essay on Belief, its Varieties and Conditions ("Sensation and Intuition,” ch. iv.).  To this essay I must refer the reader for a fuller analysis of the subject.

[137] For an account of the difference of mechanism in memory and expectation, see Taine, De l’Intelligence, 2ieme partie, livre premier, ch. ii. sec. 6.

[138] J.S.  Mill distinguishes expectation as a radically distinct mode of belief from memory, but does not bring out the contrast with respect to activity here emphasized (James Mill’s Analysis of the Human Mind, edited by J.S.  Mill, p. 411, etc.).  For a fuller statement of my view of the relation of belief to action, as compared with that of Professor Bain, see my earlier work.

[139] For some good remarks on the logical aspects of future events as matters of fact, see Mr. Venn’s Logic of Chance, ch. x.

[140] James Mill’s Analysis of the Human Mind, edited by J.S.  Mill, vol. i p. 414, et seq.

[141] Principles of Geology, ch. iii.

[142] To make this rough analysis more complete, I ought, perhaps, to include the effect of all the errors of introspection, memory, and spontaneous belief, into which the person himself falls, in so far as they communicate themselves to others.

[143] In the case of a vain woman thinking herself much more pretty than others think her, the error is still more obviously one connected with a belief in objective fact.

[144] The Study of Sociology, ch. ix.

[145] As a matter of fact, the proportion of accurate knowledge to error is far larger in the case of classes than of individuals.  Propositions with general terms for subject are less liable to be faulty than propositions with singular terms for subject.

[146] For a description of each of these extremes of boundless gaiety and utter despondency, see Griesinger, op. cit., Bk.  III. ch. i. and ii.  The relation of pessimism to pathological conditions is familiar enough; less familiar is the relation of unrestrained optimism.  Yet Griesinger writes that among the insane “boundless hilarity,” with “a feeling of good fortune,” and a general contentment with everything, is as frequent as depression and repining (see especially p. 281, also pp. 64, 65).

[147] It has been seen that, from a purely psychological point of view, even what looks at first like pure presentative cognition, as, for example, the recognition of a present feeling of the mind, involves an ingredient of representation.

[148] See especially what was said about the rationale of illusions of perception, pp. 37, 38.

[149] I say “usually,” because, as we have seen, there may sometimes be a permanent and even an inherited predisposition to active illusion in the individual temperament and nervous organization.