[93] See p. 53.

[94] See Maury, loc. cit., p. 146.

[95] See what was said respecting the influence of a dominant emotional agitation on the interpretation of actual sense-impressions.

[96] It is proved experimentally that the ear has a much closer organic connection with the vocal organ than the eye has.  Donders found that the period required for responding vocally to a sound-signal is less than that required for responding in the same way to a light-signal.

[97] On the nature of this impulse, as illustrated in waking and in sleep, see the article by Delboeuf, “Le Sommeil et les Reves,” in the Revue Philosophique, June, 1880, p. 636.

[98] Physiologische Psychologie, p. 660.

[99] I may, perhaps, observe, after giving two dreams which have to do with mathematical operations, that, though I was very fond of them in my college days, I have long ceased to occupy myself with these processes.  I would add, by way of redeeming my dream-intelligence from a deserved charge of silliness, that I once performed a respectable intellectual feat when asleep.  I put together the riddle, “What might a wooden ship say when her side was stove in?  Tremendous!” (Tree-mend-us).  I was aware of having tried to improve on the form of this pun.  I am happy to say I am not given to punning during waking life, though I had a fit of it once.  It strikes me that punning, consisting as it does essentially of overlooking sense and attending to sound, is just such a debased kind of intellectual activity as one might look for in sleep.

[100] See Radestock, op. cit., ch. ix.; Vergleichung des Traumes mit dem Wahnsinn.

[101] For Spinoza’s experience, given in his own words, see Mr. F. Pollock’s Spinoza, p. 57; cf. what Wundt says on his experience, Physiologische Psychologie, p. 648, footnote 2.

[102] See an interesting account of “Recent Researches on Hypnotism,” by G. Stanley Hall, in Mind, January, 1881.

[103] I need hardly observe that physiology shows that there is no separation of different elementary colour-sensations which are locally identical.

[104] This kind of error is, of course, common to all kinds of cognition, in so far as they involve comparison.  Thus, the presence of the excitement of the emotion of wonder at the sight of an unusually large object, say a mountain, disposes the mind to look on it as the largest of its class.  Such illusions come midway between presentative and representative illusions.  They might, perhaps, be specially marked off as illusions of “judgment.”