“Cavalry soldiers must, of course, learn to be expert rifle shots, but the attainment of this desirable object will be brought no nearer by ignoring the horse, the sword or the lance.  On the contrary, the elan and dash which perfection in Cavalry manoeuvres imparts to large bodies of horsemen will be of inestimable value in their employment as mounted rifle-men when the field is laid open to their enterprise in this role by the defeat of the hostile Cavalry.  That the Cavalry on both sides in the recent war did not distinguish themselves or their Arm, is an undoubted fact, but the reason is quite apparent.  On the Japanese side they were indifferently mounted, the riding was not good, and they were very inferior in numbers, and hence were only enabled to fulfil generally the role of Divisional Cavalry, which they appear to have done very well.  The cause of failure on the Russian side is to be found in the fact that for years they have been trained on exactly the same principles which these writers now advocate.  They were devoid of real Cavalry training, they thought of nothing but getting off their horses and shooting; hence they lamentably failed in enterprises which demanded, before all, a display of the highest form of Cavalry spirit.”

On the other hand Sir John French protests against the tendency to ultra-caution in handling cavalry at manoeuvres.  The cavalry charge is always a risk.  The risk taken by the Field-Marshal, for instance, when he ordered the famous charge which won him the way to Kimberley, would certainly have been regarded as fatal at official manoeuvres.  It is absurd, he insists, that the umpires should call on cavalry to surrender the moment that they come face to face with an infantry fire.  Such a moment may be the cavalry’s great opportunity.

[Page Heading:  VIEWS ON CAVALRY]

Many of the modern armies, he holds, are suffering from cavalry without confidence.  And there is abundant evidence to justify the charge.  Bernhardi has pointed out that the phenomenal successes of the German cavalry in the war of 1870-1 were due not to its own extraordinary valour, but to the absence of opposition on the part of the French.  Von Moltke made a similar criticism (which Sir John French approves) on the Prussian cavalry after the war of 1866.  “Our cavalry failed,” he wrote, “perhaps not so much in actual capacity as in self-confidence.  All its initiative had been destroyed at manoeuvres, where criticism and blame had been almost synonymous, and it therefore shirked independent bold action, and kept far in the rear, and as much as possible out of sight.”

French, in fact, is convinced that the “cavalry battle” is by no means a thing of the past.  Until the enemy’s cavalry is overthrown, the work of the mounted infantryman cannot begin.  So long as opposing countries train efficient cavalry, the clash of the rival horsemen is the inevitable preliminary of any campaign.