=The Praetor’s Edict.=—­To apply the sacred rules of law a supreme magistrate was needed at Rome.  Only a consul or a praetor could direct a tribunal and, according to the Roman expression, “say the law.”  The consuls engaged especially with the army ordinarily left this care to the praetors.

There were always at Rome at least two praetors as judges:  one adjudicated matters between citizens and was called the praetor of the city (praetor urbanus); the other judged cases between citizens and aliens and was called praetor of the aliens (praetor peregrinus), or, more exactly, praetor between aliens and citizens.  There was need of at least two tribunals, since an alien could not be admitted to the tribunal of the citizens.  These praetors, thanks to their absolute power, adjusted cases according to their sense of equity; the praetor of the aliens was bound by no law, for the Roman laws were made only for Roman citizens.  And yet, since each praetor was to sit and judge for a year, on entering upon his office he promulgated a decree in which he indicated the rules that he expected to follow in his tribunal; this was the Praetor’s Edict.  At the end of the year, when the praeter left his office, his ordinance was no longer in force, and his successor had the right to make an entirely different one.  But it came to be the custom for each praetor to preserve the edicts of his predecessors, making a few changes and some additions.  Thus accumulated for centuries the ordinances of the magistrates.  At last the emperor Hadrian in the second century had the Praetorian Edict codified and gave it the force of law.

=Civil Law and the Law of Nations.=—­As there were two separate tribunals, there developed two systems of rules, two different laws.  The rules applied to the affairs of citizens by the praetor of the city formed the Civil Law—­that is to say, the law of the city.  The rules followed by the praetor of aliens constituted the Law of Nations—­that is to say, of the peoples (alien to Rome).  It was then perceived that of these two laws the more human, the more sensible, the simpler—­in a word, the better, was the law of aliens.  The law of citizens, derived from the superstitious and strict rules of the old Romans, had preserved from this rude origin troublesome formulas and barbarous regulations.  The Law of Nations, on the contrary, had for its foundation the dealings of merchants and of men established in Rome, dealings that were free from every formula, from every national prejudice, and were slowly developed and tried by the experience of several centuries.  And so it may be seen how contrary to reason the ancient law was.  “Strict law is the highest injustice,” is a Roman proverb.  The praetors of the city set themselves to correct the ancient law and to judge according to equity or justice.  They came gradually to apply to citizens the same rules that the praetor of the aliens followed in his tribunal.  For example, the Roman law ordained that only relatives on the male side should be heirs; the praetor summoned the relatives on the female side also to participate in the succession.