the world” “in all ages” to justify slavery,[7] and once came the counter declaration that “Greece and Rome were made unhappy by their slaves."[8] On the other hand, the military weakness of slavery in the late war led to many arguments on that score.  Luther Martin and George Mason dwelt on the danger of a servile class in war and insurrection; while Rutledge hotly replied that he “would readily exempt the other states from the obligation to protect the Southern against them;” and Ellsworth thought that the very danger would “become a motive to kind treatment.”  The desirability of keeping slavery out of the West was once mentioned as an argument against the trade:  to this all seemed tacitly to agree.[9]

Throughout the debate it is manifest that the Convention had no desire really to enter upon a general slavery argument.  The broader and more theoretic aspects of the question were but lightly touched upon here and there.  Undoubtedly, most of the members would have much preferred not to raise the question at all; but, as it was raised, the differences of opinion were too manifest to be ignored, and the Convention, after its first perplexity, gradually and perhaps too willingly set itself to work to find some “middle ground” on which all parties could stand.  The way to this compromise was pointed out by the South.  The most radical pro-slavery arguments always ended with the opinion that “if the Southern States were let alone, they will probably of themselves stop importations."[10] To be sure, General Pinckney admitted that, “candidly, he did not think South Carolina would stop her importations of slaves in any short time;” nevertheless, the Convention “observed,” with Roger Sherman, “that the abolition of slavery seemed to be going on in the United States, and that the good sense of the several states would probably by degrees complete it.”  Economic forces were evoked to eke out moral motives:  when the South had its full quota of slaves, like Virginia it too would abolish the trade; free labor was bound finally to drive out slave labor.  Thus the chorus of “laissez-faire” increased; and compromise seemed at least in sight, when Connecticut cried, “Let the trade alone!” and Georgia denounced it as an “evil.”  Some few discordant notes were heard, as, for instance, when Wilson of Pennsylvania made the uncomforting remark, “If South Carolina and Georgia were themselves disposed to get rid of the importation of slaves in a short time, as had been suggested, they would never refuse to unite because the importation might be prohibited.”

With the spirit of compromise in the air, it was not long before the general terms were clear.  The slavery side was strongly intrenched, and had a clear and definite demand.  The forces of freedom were, on the contrary, divided by important conflicts of interest, and animated by no very strong and decided anti-slavery spirit with settled aims.  Under such circumstances, it was easy for the Convention to miss the opportunity for a really great compromise, and to descend to a scheme that savored unpleasantly of “log-rolling.”  The student of the situation will always have good cause to believe that a more sturdy and definite anti-slavery stand at this point might have changed history for the better.