Weininger shrank from the idea that an individual might be made the means to an end, instead of being an end in itself.  In my opinion his justification for the translation of this formula—­framed by Kant for pure ethics—­to empirical psychology, is doubtful.  To use an individual only as a means to an end which is alien to his inmost being, is certainly immoral.  But all social life is based on a mutual relationship of means and ends; a man is an end in himself at the same time that he is a means to other individuals and the community.  The teacher is a means as far as his pupils are concerned; the poet is a means in respect to all who seek in his writings information or recreation.  To carry the stigmatisation of these facts to a logical conclusion, one would have to call it immoral to accept anything from parents or teachers; one would have to reject every good influence—­which always comes from outside—­and become completely absorbed in the cult of one’s own soul.  One would even have to object to being born, and would have to create one’s self out of nothing.  It has always been regarded as the splendid privilege of great men to exert an ennobling influence on others—­why, therefore, should the influence of a beloved woman on her lover be objectionable?

Weininger’s error in the sphere of eroticism arises from the fact of his imprisoning love in a formula which is by no means applicable to it.  In love the mutual relationship of means and ends does not exist, the lover feels that the beloved is always an end in herself in the highest sense; he would find it impossible inwardly to establish such a relationship between himself and her; very frequently himself, his well-being and his life, are of no account to him if he can serve her.  Weininger’s assertion that at the consummation of love every woman is merely the means of gratifying a man’s passion, is simply not true.  On the contrary, it is a characteristic of genuine love that the physical embrace is of no great importance, does not even rise to full consciousness.  The personality of the beloved is everything, physical sensation nothing.  Weininger identifies love with passion and his argument is easily refutable by the experience of many.  In love there is neither means nor end; if, however, categoric formulas must be used, one might speak of a reciprocal action.  Equally erroneous is his corresponding assertion that the artist loves a woman spiritually, that is, in the sense of deifying her, for the purpose of drawing from her inspiration for his work.  If he loves her, then his love is the alpha and omega of his striving, and if love inspires him to achieve a masterpiece, the effect of love on him must be considered great and good, because it is a creative effect.