Pericles.—­Their constitution had originally a foul blemish in it—­I mean, the ban of ostracism, which alone would have been sufficient to undo any State.  For there is nothing of such important use to a nation as that men who most excel in wisdom and virtue should be encouraged to undertake the business of government.  But this detestable custom deterred such men from serving the public, or, if they ventured to do so, turned even their own wisdom and virtue against them; so that in Athens it was safer to be infamous than renowned.  We are told indeed, by the advocates for this strange institution, that it was not a punishment, but meant as a guard to the equality and liberty of the State; for which reason they deem it an honour done to the persons against whom it was used; as if words could change the real nature of things, and make a banishment of ten years, inflicted on a good citizen by the suffrages of his countrymen, no evil to him, or no offence against justice and the natural right every freeman may claim—­that he shall not be expelled from any society of which he is a member without having first been proved guilty of some criminal action.

Cosmo.—­The ostracism was indeed a most unpardonable fault in the Athenian constitution.  It placed envy in the seat of justice, and gave to private malice and public ingratitude a legal right to do wrong.  Other nations are blamed for tolerating vice, but the Athenians alone would not tolerate virtue.

Pericles.—­The friends to the ostracism say that too eminent virtue destroys that equality which is the safeguard of freedom.

Cosmo.—­No State is well modelled if it cannot preserve itself from the danger of tyranny without a grievous violation of natural justice; nor would a friend to true freedom, which consists in being governed not by men but by laws, desire to live in a country where a Cleon bore rule, and where an Aristides was not suffered to remain.  But, instead of remedying this evil, you made it worse.  You rendered the people more intractable, more adverse to virtue, less subject to the laws, and more to impressions from mischievous demagogues, than they had been before your time.

Pericles.—­In truth, I did so; and therefore my place in Elysium, notwithstanding the integrity of my whole public conduct, and the great virtues I excited, is much below the rank of those who have governed commonwealths or limited monarchies, not merely with a concern for their present advantage, but also with a prudent regard to that balance of power on which their permanent happiness must necessarily depend.

DIALOGUE XXIV.

LOCKE—­BAYLE.

Bayle.—­Yes, we both were philosophers; but my philosophy was the deepest.  You dogmatised; I doubted.

Locke.—­Do you make doubting a proof of depth in philosophy?  It may be a good beginning of it, but it is a bad end.