But if you propose (with the writer) that Fine
Art shall regard the general happiness of man,
but addressing those attributes which are peculiarly
human, by exciting the activity of his rational
and benevolent powers (and the writer would add, man’s
religious aspirations, but omits it as sufficiently
evolvable from the proposition, and since some well-willing
men cannot at present recognize man as a religious
animal), then the subject of Fine Art should be drawn
from objects which address and excite the activity
of man’s rational and benevolent powers, such
as:—acts of justice—of mercy—good
government—order—acts of intellect—men
obviously speaking or thinking abstract thoughts,
as evinced by one speaking to another, and looking
at, or indicating, a flower, or a picture, or a star,
or by looking on the wall while speaking—or,
if the scene be from a good play, or story,
or another beneficent work, then not only of men in
abstract thought or meditation, but, it may be, in
simple conversation, or in passion—or a
simple representation of a person in a play or story,
as of Jacques, Ferdinand, or Cordelia; or, in real
life, portraits of those who are honestly beautiful;
or expressive of innocence, happiness, benevolence,
or intellectuality, but not of gluttony, wantonness,
anger, hatred, or malevolence, unless in some cases
of justifiable satire—of histrionic or historic
portraiture—landscape—natural
phenomena—animals, not indiscriminately—in
some cases, grand or beautiful buildings, even without
figures—any scene on sea or land which induces
reflection—all subjects from such parts
of history as are morally or intellectually instructive
or attractive—and therefore pageants—battles—and
even executions—all forms of thought
and poetry, however wild, if consistent with rational
benevolence—all scenes serious or comic,
domestic or historical—all religious subjects
proposing good that will not shock any reasonable number
of reasonable men—all subjects that leave
the artist wiser and happier—and none which
intrinsically act otherwise—to sum all,
every thing or incident in nature which excites, or
may be made to excite, the mind and the heart of man
as a mentally intelligent, not as a brute animal,
is a subject for Fine Art, at all times, in all places,
and in all ages. But as all these subjects in
nature affect our hearts or our understanding in proportion
to the heart and understanding we have to apprehend
and to love them, those will excite us most intensely
which we know most of and love most. But as we
may learn to know them all and to love them all, and
what is dark to-day may be luminous to-morrow, and
things, dumb to-day, to-morrow grow voiceful, and
the strange voice of to-day be plain and reproach
us to-morrow; who shall adventure to say that this
or that is the highest? And if it appear that
all these subjects in nature may affect us
with equal intensity, and that the artist’s representations
affect as the subjects affect, then it follows, with
all these subjects, Fine Art may affect us equally;
but the subjects may all be high; therefore, all Fine
Art may be High Art.