We have entered thus at length on the investigation of adequacy and appropriateness of style, and of the mode by which entire classes of disputable points, usually judged under that name, may be reduced to the more essential element of conception; because it will be almost invariably found, that a mere arbitrary standard of irresponsible private predilection is then resorted to.  Nor can this be well guarded against.  The concrete, style, being assumed as always constituting an entity auxiliary to, but not of necessity modified by, and representing subject,—­as something substantially pre-existing in the author’s mind or practice, and belonging to him individually; the reader will, not without show of reason, betake himself to the trial of personality by personality, another’s by his own; and will thus pronounce on poems or passages of poems not as elevated, or vigorous, or well-sustained, or the opposite, in idea, but, according to certain notions of his own, as attractive, original, or conventional writing.

Thus far as regards those parts of execution which concern human{13} embodiment—­the metaphysical and dramatic or epic faculties.  Of style in description the reader is more nearly as competent a judge as the writer.  In the one case, the poet is bound to realize an idea, which is his own, and the justness of which, and therefore of the form of its expression, can be decided only by reasoning and analogy; in the other, having for his type material phaenomena, he must reproduce the things as cognizable by all, though not hereby in any way exempt from adhering absolutely to his proper perception of them.  Here, even as to ideal description or simile, the reader can assert its truth or falsehood of purpose, its sufficiency or insufficiency of means:  but here again he must beware of exceeding his rights, and of substituting himself to his author.  He must not dictate under what aspect nature is to be considered, stigmatizing the one chosen, because his own bent is rather towards some other.  In the exercise of censure, he cannot fairly allow any personal peculiarities of view to influence him; but will have to decide from common grounds of perception, unless clearly conscious of short-coming, or of the extreme of any corresponding peculiarity on the author’s part.

{13} In employing the word “human,” we would have our intention understood to include organic spiritualism—­the superhuman treated, from a human pou sto, as ideal mind, form, power, action, &c.

In speaking of the adaptation of style to conception, we advanced that, details of character and of action being a portion of the latter, the real point to determine in reference to the former is, whether such details are completely rendered in relation to the general purpose.  And here, to return to Robert Browning, we would enforce on the attention of those among his readers who assume that he spoils fine thoughts by a vicious, extravagant, and involved style, a few