It was evident that the long and obstinate continuance of Napoleon at Dresden could not fail to prove ruinous to him.  Of what service could the Elbe be to him, when Bohemia, the key to that river, was in the hands of his opponents?  These had it in their power to turn his flank as far as the Saale, without hazard or any great impediment, as the event actually proved.  Napoleon was cooped up in a narrow space, where in time, even without being defeated, he would have been in danger of starving with his army.  Dresden was to him, in some respects, what Wilna had been in 1812.  Leipzig, an open place, was now of far greater importance to him than Minsk was then.  How easily might he have lost it, as the allies were advancing in considerable force upon that place!  It was not lost, to be sure; but the communication between Dresden and Leipzig, and Leipzig and Erfurt, was, if not cut off, at least interrupted; his supplies became more and more precarious, and a large garrison, which it was deemed necessary to reinforce with strong detachments from the main army, was locked up in Leipzig.

When in August Austria declared herself decidedly in favour of Russia and Prussia, it was natural to expect that Napoleon would have totally relinquished the useless defence of Saxony, and have adopted a new plan of operations, in order to cover and preserve the other states of the confederation of the Rhine.  That he would infallibly be compelled to evacuate Saxony, was evident from the slightest inspection of the map.  In this beautiful province he could expect no other glory than that of plunging it, by his inflexible obstinacy, into the most abject misery.  The combined monarchs had nothing to fear for their own dominions; they needed to do no more than to carry on for some time a mere war of observation, and to recruit their forces.  They might quietly await the moment when Napoleon should leave Dresden, and, on his arrival, force him to a general engagement in any situation which they should deem most advantageous.  Too late did Napoleon resolve upon retreat.  He was obliged to commence it in the midst of an immense quadrangle which the allies formed about him, and to direct his course towards Leipzig.  He could not, however, yet determine to give up Dresden, but left there a considerable army, thus weakening himself, and sacrificing it, as well as the garrisons of the fortresses on the Elbe and Oder, to no purpose whatever, in case he should lose a battle.  At length, near Leipzig, he was forced, into the arduous conflict.  Since the latter half of August, the talents which he had heretofore displayed for comprehensive and profound combinations seemed to have totally deserted him.  All his measures and plans appeared imperfect, and betrayed a vacillation which he had never yet manifested.  He seems to have been as uncertain respecting the strength of his antagonists as in regard to their grand plan of deciding the fate of the campaign with a single blow.