Lectures on Language eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 260 pages of information about Lectures on Language.

Lectures on Language eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 260 pages of information about Lectures on Language.
changes in the word.  Formerly we said an union, an holiday, an universalist, an unitarian, &c., expressions which are now rarely heard.  We now say a union, &c.  This single instance proves that arbitrary rules of grammar have little to do in the regulation of language.  Its barriers are of sand, soon removed.  It will not be said that this is an unimportant mistake, for, if an error, it is pernicious, and if a grammarian knows enough to say that a becomes an, he ought to know that he tells a falsehood, and that an becomes a under certain circumstances.  Mr. Murray gives the following example to illustrate the use of a.  “Give me a book; that is, any book.”  How can the learner understand such a rule?  How will it apply?  Let us try it.  “A man has a wife;” that is, any man has any wife.  I have a hat; that is, any hat.  A farmer has a farm—­any farmer has any farm.  A merchant in Boston has a beautiful piece of broadcloth—­any merchant in Boston has any beautiful piece of broadcloth.  A certain king of Europe decreed a protestant to be burned—­any king of Europe decreed any protestant to be burned.  How ridiculous are the rules we have learned and taught to others, to enable them to “speak and write with propriety.”  No wonder we never understood grammar, if so at variance with truth and every day’s experience.  The rules of grammar as usually taught can never be observed in practice.  Hence it is called a dry study.  In every thing else we learn something that we can understand, which will answer some good purpose in the affairs of life.  But this branch of science is among the things which have been tediously learned to no purpose.  No good account can be given of its advantages.

The, we are told, “is called the definite article, because it ascertains what particular thing or things are meant.”  A most unfortunate definition, and quite as erroneous as the former.  Let us try it. The stars shine, the lion roars, the camel is a beast of burden, the deer is good for food, the wind blows, the clouds appear, the Indians are abused.  What is there in these examples, which “ascertain what particular thing or things are meant?” They are expressions as indefinite as we can imagine.

On the other hand, should I say a star shines, a lion roars, an Indian is abused, a wind blows, a cloud appears, you would understand me to allude very definitely to one “particular” object, as separate and distinguished from others of its kind.

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Lectures on Language from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.