It is manifest that the Chief Consul was wonderfully ignorant of the English constitution, if he really believed that the King (whose public acts must all be done by the hands of responsible ministers) could answer his letter personally.  The reply was an official note from Lord Grenville, then secretary of state for the department of foreign affairs, to Talleyrand.  It stated “that the King of England had no object in the war but the security of his own dominions, his allies, and Europe in general; he would seize the first favourable opportunity to make peace—­at present he could see none.  The same general assertions of pacific intentions had proceeded, successively, from all the revolutionary governments of France; and they had all persisted in conduct directly and notoriously the opposite of their language.  Switzerland, Italy, Holland, Germany, Egypt,—­what country had been safe from French aggression?  The war must continue until the causes which gave it birth ceased to exist.  The restoration of the exiled royal family would be the easiest means of giving confidence to the other powers of Europe.  The King of England by no means pretended to dictate anything as to the internal polity of France; but he was compelled to say, that he saw nothing in the circumstances under which the new government had been set up, or the principles it professed to act upon, which could tend to make foreign powers regard it as either more stable or more trustworthy than the transitory forms it had supplanted.”

Such was the tenor of Lord Grenville’s famous note.  It gave rise to an animated discussion in both Houses immediately on the meeting of the British Parliament; and, in both, the conduct of the ministry was approved by very great majorities.  When, however, the financial preparations were brought forward, and it turned out that Russia was no longer to be subsidised—­or, in other words, had abandoned the league against France—­the prospects of the war were generally considered as much less favourable than they had been during this discussion.  In the meantime the French government put forth, by way of commentary on Lord Grenville’s state paper, a pretended letter from the unfortunate heir of the House of Stuart to George III., demanding from him the throne of England, which, now that the principle of legitimacy seemed to be recognised at St. James’s, there could (said the pasquinade) be no fair pretext for refusing.  Some other trifles of the same character might be noticed; but the true answer to Mr. Pitt was the campaign of Marengo.

Buonaparte rejoiced cordially in the result of his informal negotiation.  It was his policy, even more clearly than it had been that of his predecessors, to buy security at home by battle and victory abroad.  The national pride had been deeply wounded during his absence; and something must be done in Europe, worthy of the days of Lodi, and Rivoli, and Tagliamento, ere he could hope to be seated firmly on his throne.