Napoleon reached the coast on the 22nd August, and was there met by Berthier, Andreossi, Murat, Lannes, Marmont, and the savans Monge and Berthollet; none of whom had suspected for what purpose they were summoned.  Admiral Gantheaume had by this time two frigates and two smaller vessels (which had been saved in the harbour of Alexandria) ready for sea; and on the morning of the 23rd, the wind having fortunately driven the English squadron of blockade off the coast, Buonaparte and his followers embarked at Rosetta.

The same day the event was announced to the army by a proclamation which the General left behind him, naming Kleber as his successor in the command.  The indignation of the soldiery, who thought themselves deserted by their chief, was for a time violent; but, by degrees, the great qualities displayed by Kleber softened this feeling, and Buonaparte had left agents well qualified to explain what had happened, in the manner most favourable for himself.

Kleber received at the same time a parting letter of instructions—­one of the most singular pieces that ever proceeded from Napoleon’s pen.  “I send you,” said he, “English gazettes to the 10th of June.  You will there see that we have lost Italy; that Mantua, Turin, and Tortona are blockaded.  I hope, if fortune smiles on me, to reach Europe before the beginning of October....  It is the intention of government that General Dessaix should follow me, unless great events interpose themselves, in the course of November....  There is no doubt that, on the arrival of our squadron at Toulon, means will be found of sending you the recruits and munitions necessary for the army of Egypt.  The government will then correspond with you directly; while I, both in my public and in my private capacity, will take measures to secure for you frequent intelligence.”

Buonaparte proceeds, after thus boldly assuming to himself the right of speaking for the government—­and in terms, it will be observed, calculated to leave no doubt that his own departure was the result of orders from Paris—­to impress upon Kleber the necessity of always considering the possession of Egypt as a point of the highest importance to France; and, nevertheless, of negotiating, as long as possible, with the Porte, on the basis that the French Republic neither had now, nor ever had had, the smallest wish to be permanently mistress of that country.  He finally authorised Kleber, if not released or recruited by May following, to make a peace with the Porte, even if the first of its conditions should be the total evacuation of Egypt.

Then follow directions for the internal administration of Egypt, in which, among other sufficiently characteristic hints, Kleber is desired to cultivate the good will of the Christians, but, nevertheless, to avoid carefully giving the Mussulmans any reason to confound the Christians with the French.  “Above all,” says Napoleon, “gain the Sheiks, who are timid, who cannot fight, and who, like all priests, inspire fanaticism without being fanatics.”