Thus blinded by arrogance and self-confidence, and incapable of weighing any other considerations against what he considered as the essence of his personal glory, Napoleon refused to abate one iota of his pretensions—­until it was too late.  Then, indeed, whether more accurate intelligence from Spain had reached him, or the accounts of those who had been watching the unremitting preparations of the allies in his neighbourhood, had at length found due weight—­then, indeed, he did show some symptoms of concession.  A courier arrived at Prague with a note, in which he signified his willingness to accede to a considerable number of the Austrian stipulations.  But this was on the 11th of August.  The day preceding was that on which, by the agreement, the armistice was to end.  On that day Austria had to sign an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Russia and Prussia.  On the night between the 10th and 11th, rockets answering rockets, from height to height along the frontiers of Bohemia and Silesia, had announced to all the armies of the allies this accession of strength and the immediate recommencement of hostilities.

On neither side had the pending negotiation been permitted for a moment to interrupt or slacken military preparation.  Napoleon had sent Beauharnois into Italy, to be ready in case of any Austrian demonstration in that quarter; and General Wrede, with the Bavarian army, guarded his rear.  An Austrian army, 60,000 strong, was now ready to pass the Alps; and, to watch Wrede, another corps of 40,000, under the Prince of Reuss, had taken their station.  These were minor arrangements.  The forces now assembled around Napoleon himself were full 250,000 in number, and disposed as follows:  Macdonald lay with 100,000 at Buntzlaw, on the border of Silesia; another corps of 50,000 had their headquarters at Zittau, in Lusatia; St. Cyr, with 20,000, was at Pirna, on the great pass from Bohemia; Oudinot at Leipsig, with 60,000; while with the Emperor himself at Dresden remained 25,000 of the imperial guard, the flower of France.  The reader, on referring to the map, will perceive that these corps were so distributed as to present a formidable front on every point where it was likely the allies should hazard an attack, and, moreover, so that Napoleon could speedily reinforce any threatened position with his reserve from Dresden.  For the armies to be opposed were thus situated:—­Behind the Erzgebirge, or Metallic Mountains, and having their headquarters at Prague, lay The Grand Army of the Allies (consisting of 120,000 Austrians and 80,000 Russians and Prussians), commanded in chief by the Austrian general Schwartzenberg.  The French corps at Zittau and Pirna were prepared to encounter these, should they attempt to force their way into Saxony, either on the right or the left of the Elbe.  The Second Army of the Allies (consisting of 80,000 Russians and Prussians), called the Army of Silesia, and commanded by Blucher, lay in advance at Breslau.