in the commencement of the spring.  But Napoleon had excellent reasons for suspecting that were he and his army cut off from all communication, during six months, with what they had left behind them, the Prussians, the Austrians, his Rhenish vassals themselves, might throw off the yoke:  while, on the other hand, the Russians could hardly fail, in the course of so many months, to accumulate, in their own country, a force before which his isolated army, on re-issuing from their winter quarters, would appear a mere speck.

Napoleon at length sent Count Lauriston to the headquarters of Kutusoff, with another letter to Alexander, which the Count was to deliver in person.  Kutusoff received the Frenchman in the midst of all his generals, and answered with such civility that the envoy doubted not of success.  The end, however, was that the Russian professed himself altogether unable to entertain any negotiation, or even to sanction the journey of any French messenger—­such being, he said, the last and most express orders of his Prince.  He offered to send on Napoleon’s letter to St. Petersburg, by one of his own aides-de-camp; and to this Lauriston was obliged to agree.  This interview occurred on the 6th of October:  no answer from St. Petersburg could be expected sooner than the 26th.  There had already been one fall of snow.  To retreat after having a second time written to the Czar, would appear like the confession of inability to remain.  The difficulties and dangers attendant on a longer sojourn in the ruined capital have already been mentioned; and they were increasing with fearful rapidity every hour.  It was under such circumstances that Napoleon lingered on in the Kremlin until the 19th of October; and it seems probable that he would have lingered even more days there, had he not received the tidings of a new reverse, near at hand, and which effectually stirred him.  His attendants have not hesitated to say that, from the time when he entered Russia, his mind had seemed to be in a state of indecision and lethargy, when compared with what they had been accustomed to witness in previous campaigns.  From this hour his decision and activity (if indeed they had ever been obscured) appear to have been displayed abundantly.

Murat had, without Napoleon’s command, and indeed in opposition to his wishes, established a strange species of armistice with Kutusoff, under articles which provided that three hours’ notice must precede any regular affair between the two armies confronted to each other, but allowed the petty warfare of the Cossacks and other light troops to proceed without interruption on either flank.  This suited Kutusoff’s purpose; for it in effect left him in full possession of the means to avoid a general action until he chose to hazard one, and yet offered no interruption to the measures by which he and his nation were deliberately and systematically straitening the supplies of the invader.  Napoleon alleged that Murat had entered on the compact from the desire