commenced his retreat.  He was joined in the course of it by Hill, and Soult and Clausel then effected their junction also, in his rear—­their troops being nearly double his numbers.  He retired leisurely and deliberately as far as Ciudad Rodrigo—­and thus closed the Peninsular campaign of 1812.  But in sketching its progress we have lost sight for a moment of the still mightier movements in which Napoleon was personally engaged upon another scene of action.

It has already been mentioned, that before the year 1811 reached its close, the approach of a rupture with Russia was sufficiently indicated in an edict of the Emperor of Austria, granting a free passage through his territories to the armies of his son-in-law.  However, during several months following, the negotiations between the Czar and Napoleon continued; and more than once there appeared considerable likelihood of their finding an amicable termination.  The tidings of Lord Wellington’s successes at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos were calculated to temper the ardour of Buonaparte’s presumption; and for a moment he seems to have felt the necessity of bringing the affairs of the Peninsula to a point, ere he should venture to involve himself in another warfare.  He, in effect, opened a communication with the English government, when the fall of Badajos was announced to him; but before the negotiation had proceeded many steps, his pride returned on him in its original obstinacy, and the renewed demand, that Joseph should be recognised as King of Spain, abruptly closed the intercourse of the diplomatists.

Such being the state of the Peninsula, and all hope of an accommodation with England at an end, it might have been expected that Napoleon would have spared no effort to accommodate his differences with Russia, or, if a struggle must come, to prepare for it, by placing his relations with the other powers, capable of interfering on one side or the other, on a footing favourable to himself.  But here also the haughty temper, which adversity itself could never bend, formed an insurmountable and fatal obstacle.  To gain the cordial friendship of Sweden was obviously, from the geographical position of that country, and the high military talents of Bernadotte, an object of the most urgent importance; yet the Crown Prince, instead of being treated with as the head of an independent state, was personally insulted by the French resident at Stockholm, who, in Bernadotte’s own language, “demeaned himself on every occasion as if he had been a Roman proconsul, dictating absolutely in a province.”  In his anxiety to avoid a rupture, Bernadotte at length agreed to enforce the “continental system,” and to proclaim war against England.  But these concessions, instead of producing hearty goodwill, had a directly contrary effect.  England, considering Sweden as an involuntary enemy, disdained to make any attempt against her; and the adoption of the anti-commercial edicts of Napoleon was followed by a multiplicity of collisions