this it was with difficulty that the various independent generals could be prevailed on even to meet at Madrid, and agree to the outline of a joint campaign; and that outline seemed to have no recommendation except that its gross military defects held out to each member of the Council the prospect of being able to act without communication, for good or for evil, with any of the others.  The consequences of these shameful follies were calamitous:  and but for events which could not have been foreseen, must have proved fatal:  for the gigantic resources of the common enemy were about to be set in motion by Napoleon himself; who, on hearing of the reverses of Dupont, Lefebre, and Junot, perceived too clearly that the affairs of the Peninsula demanded a keener eye and a firmer hand than his brother’s.

[Footnote 59:  Col.  Napier, chap. i.]

CHAPTER XXV

Napoleon at Erfurt—­At Paris—­Arrives at Vittoria—­Disposition of the French and Spanish Armies—­Successes of Soult—­Passage of the Somosierra—­Surrender of Madrid—­Sir John Moore’s Campaign—­his Retreat—­Battle of Coruna—­Death of Moore—­Napoleon leaves Spain.

Three Spanish armies, each unfortunately under an independent chief, were at length in motion:  their nominal strength was 130,000 men; in reality they never exceeded 100,000.  Had they been combined under an able general, they might have assaulted the French army, now not exceeding 60,000, with every likelihood of success; for the position first taken up by King Joseph, after his retreat into the north, was very defective; but the Spaniards chose their basis of operations so absurdly, and were so dilatory afterwards, that Napoleon had time both to rectify Joseph’s blunders and to reinforce his legions effectually, before they were able to achieve any considerable advantage.

Blake, who commanded on the west, extended his line from Burgos to Bilboa; Palafox, on the east, lay between Zaragossa and Sanguessa; Castanos, general of the central army, had his headquarters at Soria.  The three armies thus lay in a long and feeble crescent, of which the horns were pushed towards the French frontier; while the enemy, resting on three strong fortresses, remained on the defensive until the Emperor should pour new forces through the passes of the Pyrenees.  It was expected that the English army in Portugal would forthwith advance, and put themselves in communication either with Blake or with Castanos; and had this junction occurred soon after the battle of Virniero, the result might have been decisive:  but Wellesley was recalled to London to bear witness on the trial of Dalrymple; and Sir John Moore, who then assumed the command, received neither such supplies as were necessary for any great movement, nor any clear and authentic intelligence from the authorities of Madrid, nor finally any distinct orders from his own government—­until the favourable moment had gone by.  In effect, Napoleon’s gigantic reinforcements had begun to show themselves within the Spanish frontier, a week before the English general was in a condition to commence his march.