The History of Napoleon Buonaparte eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 679 pages of information about The History of Napoleon Buonaparte.

The History of Napoleon Buonaparte eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 679 pages of information about The History of Napoleon Buonaparte.
and the left wing compelled to wheel backwards so as to form almost at right angles with the rest of the line.  The Prussian corps of L’Estocq, a small but determined fragment of the campaign of Jena, appeared at this critical moment in the rear of the Russian left; and, charging with such gallantry as had in former times been expected from the soldiery of the Great Frederick, drove back Davoust and restored the Russian line.  The action continued for many hours along the whole line—­the French attacked boldly, the Russians driving them back with unfailing resolution.  Ney, and a fresh division, at length came up, and succeeded in occupying the village of Schloditten, on the road to Konigsberg.  To regain this, and thereby recover the means of communicating with the King of Prussia, was deemed necessary; and it was carried accordingly at the point of the bayonet.  This was at ten o’clock at night.  So ended the longest and by far the severest battle in which Buonaparte had as yet been engaged.  The French are supposed to have had 90,000 men under arms at its commencement; the Russians not more than 60,000.  After fourteen hours of fighting, either army occupied the same position as in the morning.  Twelve of Napoleon’s eagles were in the hands of Bennigsen, and the field between was covered with 50,000 corpses, of whom at least half were French.

Either leader claimed the victory; Bennigsen exhibiting as proof of his success the twelve eagles which his army, admitted to be inferior in numbers, bore off the field:  Buonaparte, that he kept possession of the field, while the enemy retired, the very night after the battle, from Eylau towards Konigsberg.  It was, in truth, a drawn battle; and to have found an equal was sufficient bitterness to Napoleon.  The Russian general-in-chief had retreated, in opposition to the opinion of most of his council, out of anxiety for the personal safety of the King of Prussia at Konigsberg, and desire to recruit his army ere another great action should be hazarded.  The French, triumphant as was the language of their bulletins, made no effort to pursue.  Bennigsen conducted his army in perfect order to Konigsberg, and the Cossacks issuing from that city continued for more than a week to waste the country according to their pleasure, without any show of opposition from the French.  But the best proof how severely Napoleon had felt the struggle of Preuss-Eylau, is to be found in a communication which he made to Frederick William, on the 13th of February, five days after the battle, offering him, in effect, the complete, or nearly complete restoration of his dominions, provided he would accept of a separate peace:  with the king’s answer; namely, that it was impossible for him to enter on any treaty unless the Czar were a party in it.  Finally, on the 19th of February, Napoleon left Eylau, and retreated with his whole army on the Vistula; satisfied that it would be fatal rashness to engage in another campaign in Poland, while several fortified towns, and, above all, Dantzick, held out in his rear; and determined to have possession of these places, and to summon new forces from France, ere he should again meet in the field such an enemy as the Russian had proved to be.

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The History of Napoleon Buonaparte from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.