Timon calls him somewhat, but not entirely, free from vanity, when he said—­

  “Xenophanes somewhat free from vanity, mocker of
          Homeric deceit,
   Far from men he conceived a god, on all sides equal,
   Above pain, a being spiritualised, or intellect.”

In saying that he was somewhat free from vanity, he meant that he was in some things free from vanity.  He called him a mocker of the Homeric deceit because he had scoffed at the deceit in Homer.  Xenophanes also dogmatised, contrary to the assumptions 225 of other men, that all things are one, and that God is grown together with all things, that He is spherical, insensible, unchangeable, and reasonable, whence the difference of Xenophanes from us is easily proved.  In short, from what has been said, it is evident that although Plato expresses doubt about some things, so long as he has expressed himself in certain places in regard to the existence of unknown things, or as preferring some things to others in trustworthiness, he cannot be, it seems to me, a Sceptic.  Those of the New Academy, although they say that all things are incomprehensible, 226 differ from the Sceptics, perhaps even in saying that all things are incomprehensible (for they assert decidedly in regard to this, but the Sceptic thinks it possible that some things may be comprehended), but they differ evidently still further from us in their judgment of good and evil.  For the Academicians say that there is such a thing as good and evil, not as we say it, but more with the conviction that that which they call good exists than that it does not; and likewise in regard to the evil, while we do not say anything is good or evil with the conviction that it is probably so, but we live our lives in an unprejudiced way in order not to be inactive.  Moreover, we say that our ideas are equal to each other in trustworthiness 227 and untrustworthiness, as far as their nature goes, while they say that some are probable and others improbable.  They make a difference also between the improbable ones, for they believe that some of them are only probable, others probable and undisputed, still others probable, undisputed, and tested.  As for example, when a coiled rope is lying in a somewhat dark room, he who comes in suddenly gets only a probable idea of it, and thinks that it is a serpent; but it appears to be a rope 228 to him who has looked carefully around, and found out that it does not move, and that it is of such a color, and so on, according to an idea which is probable and undisputed.  The tested idea is like this:  It is said that Hercules led Alcestis after she was dead back again from Hades and showed her to Admetus, and he received an idea that was probable and undisputed regarding Alcestis.  As, however, he knew that she was dead, his mind drew back from belief and inclined to disbelief.  Now those belonging to the New Academy prefer the idea which 229