Some say further that the Academic philosophy is the same as 220 Scepticism, therefore it seems appropriate to me to treat of that also.  There have been, as the most say, three Academies—­the most ancient one, that of Plato and his followers; the second and middle one, that of Arcesilaus and his followers, Arcesilaus being the pupil of Polemo; the third and new Academy, that of Carneades and Clitomachus and their followers; some add also a fourth, that of Philo and Charmides, and their followers; and some count even a fifth, that of Antiochus and his followers.  Beginning then from the old Academy, let us consider the difference between the schools of philosophy mentioned.  Now some have said that Plato was a 221 Dogmatic, others that he was a Sceptic, and others that he was in some things a Sceptic and in some things a Dogmatic.  For in the fencing dialogues, where Socrates is introduced as either making sport of someone or contending against the Sophists, Plato has, they say, a fencing and sceptical character, but he is dogmatic when he expresses himself seriously, either through Socrates or Timaeus or any such person.  In regard to those 222 who say that he is a Dogmatic, or a Dogmatic in some things and a Sceptic in others, it would be superfluous, it seems to me, to speak now, for they themselves grant that he is different from us.  The question as to whether he was really a Sceptic or not we treat more fully in the Memoranda, but here we state briefly that according to Menodotus and Aenesidemus (for these especially defended this position) Plato dogmatises when he expresses himself regarding ideas, and regarding the existence of Providence, and when he states that the virtuous life is more to be chosen than the one of vice.  If he assents to these things as true, he dogmatises; or even if he accepts them as more probable than otherwise he departs from the sceptical character, since he gives a preference to one thing above another in trustworthiness or untrustworthiness; for how foreign this is to us is evident from what we have said before.  Even if when he 223 performs mental gymnastics, as they say, he expresses some things sceptically, he is not because of this a Sceptic.  For he who dogmatises about one thing, or, in short, gives preference to one mental image over another in trustworthiness or untrustworthiness in respect to anything that is unknown, is a Dogmatic in character, as Timon shows by what he said of Xenophanes.  For after having praised Xenophanes in many 224 things, and even after having dedicated his Satires to him, he made him mourn and say—­

   “Would that I also might gain that mind profound,
   Able to look both ways.  In a treacherous path have
          I been decoyed,
   And still in old age am with all wisdom unwed. 
   For wherever I turned my view
   All things were resolved into unity; all things, alway
   From all sources drawn, were merged into nature the same.”