We have treated of a sufficient number of these formulae for 206 an outline, especially since what we have said about those mentioned applies also to others that we have omitted.  In regard to all the Sceptical formulae, it must be understood in advance that we do not affirm them to be absolutely true, because we say that they can even refute themselves, since they are themselves included in those things to which they refer, just as cathartic medicines not only purge the body of humors, but carry off themselves with the humors.  We say then that we use these 207 formulae, not as literally making known the things for which they are used, but loosely, and if one wishes, inaccurately.  It is not fitting for the Sceptic to dispute about words, especially as it contributes to our purpose to say that these formulae have no absolute meaning; their meaning is a relative one, that is, relative to the Sceptics.  Besides, it is to be 208 remembered that we do not say them about all things in general, but about the unknown, and things that are dogmatically investigated, and that we say what appears to us, and that we do not express ourselves decidedly about the nature of external objects.  By this means I think that every sophism brought against the Sceptical formulae can be overturned.  We have now 209 shown the character of Scepticism by examining its idea, its parts, its criterion and aim, and also the Tropes of [Greek:  epoche], and by treating of the Sceptical formulae.  We think it therefore appropriate to enter briefly into the distinction between Scepticism and the nearly related schools of philosophy in order to more clearly understand the Sceptical School.  We will begin with the philosophy of Heraclitus.

CHAPTER XXIX.

In what does the Sceptical School differ from the Philosophy of Heraclitus?

Now that this school differs from ours is evident, for 210 Heraclitus expresses himself about many unknown things dogmatically, which we do not, as has been said.  Aenesidemus and his followers said that the Sceptical School is the way to the philosophy of Heraclitus.  They gave as a reason for this that the statement that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, leads the way to the statement that contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing; and as the Sceptics say that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing, the Heraclitans proceed from this to the doctrine that such predicates are in reality applicable.  We reply to this that the statement that contradictory predicates appear to be applicable to the same thing is not a dogma of the Sceptics, but is a fact that presents itself not only to the Sceptics, but to other philosophers, and to all men.  No one, for instance, would 211 venture to say that honey does not taste sweet to those in health, and bitter to those who