be judged or cannot be judged?  If it cannot be judged, then we have the result necessarily of suspension of judgment, because it is impossible to express opinion in regard to things about which a difference of opinion exists which cannot be judged.  If it can be judged, then we ask how it is to be judged?  For 171 example, the sensible, for we shall limit the argument first to this—­Is it to be judged by sensible or by intellectual standards?  For if it is to be judged by a sensible one, since we are in doubt about the sensible, that will also need something else to sustain it; and if that proof is also something sensible, something else will again be necessary to prove it, and so on in infinitum.  If, on the contrary, the sensible must be judged by something intellectual, as there is disagreement 172 in regard to the intellectual, this intellectual thing will require also judgment and proof.  Now, how is it to be proved?  If by something intellectual, it will likewise be thrown into infinitum; if by something sensible, as the intellectual has been taken for the proof of the sensible, and the sensible has been taken for that of the intellectual, the circulus in probando is introduced.  If, however, in order to escape 173 from this, the one who is speaking to us expects us to take something for granted which has not been proved, in order to prove what follows, the hypothetical Trope is introduced, which provides no way of escape.  For if the one who makes the hypothesis is worthy of confidence, we should in every case be no less worthy of confidence in making a contrary hypothesis.  If the one who makes the assumption assumes something true, he makes it suspicious by using it as a hypothesis, and not as an established fact; if it is false, the foundation of the reasoning is unsound.  If a hypothesis is any help towards a 174 trustworthy result, let the thing in question itself be assumed, and not something else, by which, forsooth, one would establish the thing under discussion.  If it is absurd to assume the thing questioned, it is also absurd to assume that upon which it rests.  That all things belonging to the senses are also in 175 relation to something else is evident, because they are in relation to those who perceive them.  It is clear then, that whatever thing of sense is brought before us, it may be easily referred to one of the five Tropes.  And we come to a similar conclusion in regard to intellectual things.  For if it should be said that there is a difference of opinion regarding them which cannot be judged, it will be granted that we must suspend the judgment concerning it.  In case the difference of opinion 176 can be judged, if it is judged through anything intellectual, we fall into the regressus in infinitum, and if through anything sensible into the circulus in probando; for, as the sensible is again subject to difference of opinion, and cannot be judged by the sensible on account of the regressus