the ideas of those who are asleep with those who are
awake, nor can he who is in health compare the ideas
of the sick with those of the well; for we believe
more in the things that are present, and affecting
us at present, than in the things not present.
In 114 another way, the anomaly in such ideas
is impossible to be judged, for whoever prefers one
idea to another, and one condition to another, does
this either without a criterion and a proof, or with
a criterion and a proof; but he can do this neither
without them, for he would then be untrustworthy, nor
with them; for if he judges ideas, he judges them wholly
by a criterion, and he will say that this criterion
is either true or false. But if it is false,
he will be untrustworthy; if, on 115 the contrary,
he says that it is true, he will say that the criterion
is true either without proof or with proof. If
without proof, he will be untrustworthy; if he says
that it is true with proof, it is certainly necessary
that the proof be true, or he will be untrustworthy.
Now will he say that the proof which he has accepted
for the accrediting of the criterion is true, having
judged it, or without having judged it? If he
says so 116 without judging it, he will be untrustworthy;
if he has judged it, it is evident that he will say
that he has judged according to some criterion, and
we must seek a proof for this criterion, and for that
proof a criterion. For the proof always needs
a criterion to establish it, and the criterion needs
a proof that it may be shown to be true; and a proof
can neither be sound without a pre-existing criterion
that is true, nor a criterion true without a proof
that is shown beforehand to be trustworthy. And
so both the criterion and the proof are thrown into
the 117 circulus in probando, by which
it is found that they are both of them untrustworthy,
for as each looks for proof from the other, each is
as untrustworthy as the other. Since then one
cannot prefer one idea to another, either without a
proof and a criterion or with them, the ideas that
differ according to different conditions cannot be
judged, so that the suspension of judgment in regard
to the nature of external objects follows through
this Trope also.
THE FIFTH TROPE.
The fifth Trope is that based upon position, distance, and 118 place, for, according to each of these, the same things appear different, as for example, the same arcade seen from either end appears curtailed, but from the middle it looks symmetrical on every side; and the same ship appears small and motionless from afar, and large and in motion near by, and the same tower appears round from a distance, but square near by. So much for distance. Now in reference to place, we say that the light 119 of the lamp appears dim in the sun, but bright in the dark; and the same rudder appears broken in the sea, but straight out of it; and the egg in the bird is soft,