CHAPTER VIII.

Is Scepticism a Sect?

We respond in a similar way if we are asked whether 16 Scepticism is a sect or not.  If the word sect is defined as meaning a body of persons who hold dogmas which are in conformity with each other, and also with phenomena, and dogma means an assent to anything that is unknown, then we reply that we have no sect.  If, however, one means by sect, a school 17 which follows a certain line of reasoning based on phenomena, and that reasoning shows how it is possible to apparently live rightly, not understanding “rightly” as referring to virtue only, but in a broader sense; if, also, it leads one to be able to suspend the judgment, then we reply that we have a sect.  For we follow a certain kind of reasoning which is based upon phenomena, and which shows us how to live according to the habits, laws, and teachings of the fatherland, and our own feelings.

CHAPTER IX.

Does the Sceptic Study Natural Science?

We reply similarly also to the question whether the Sceptic 18 should study natural science.  For we do not study natural science in order to express ourselves with confidence regarding any of the dogmas that it teaches, but we take it up in order to be able to meet every argument by one of equal weight, and also for the sake of [Greek:  ataraxia].  In the same way we study the logical and ethical part of so-called philosophy.

CHAPTER X.

Do the Sceptics deny Phenomena?

Those who say that the Sceptics deny phenomena appear to me to 19 be in ignorance of our teachings.  For as we said before, we do not deny the sensations which we think we have, and which lead us to assent involuntarily to them, and these are the phenomena.  When, however, we ask whether the object is such as it appears to be, while we concede that it appears so and so, we question, not the phenomenon, but in regard to that which is asserted of the phenomenon, and that is different from doubting the phenomenon itself.  For example, it appears to us that honey is sweet.  This we concede, for we experience sweetness through 20 sensation.  We doubt, however, whether it is sweet by reason of its essence, which is not a question of the phenomenon, but of that which is asserted of the phenomenon.  Should we, however, argue directly against the phenomena, it is not with the intention of denying their existence, but to show the rashness of the Dogmatics.  For if reasoning is such a deceiver that it well nigh snatches away the phenomena from before your eyes, how should we not distrust it in regard to things that are unknown, so as not to rashly follow it?

CHAPTER XI.

The Criterion of Scepticism.