Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 167 pages of information about Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.

Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 167 pages of information about Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.

    [1] Compare Lewes Op. cit. p. 463.

    [2] Compare Chaignet Op. cit. p. 460.

We have shown that the greatest thinkers of Pyrrhonism, Pyrrho, Aenesidemus, and Agrippa, were not examples of absolute Scepticism, and although Sextus Empiricus realised what consistency demanded in this respect, and affirmed on almost every page that he was asserting nothing, yet there is not a paragraph of his books in which he does not, after all, dogmatise on some subject.  Complete Scepticism is contrary to the fundamental laws of language, as all use of verbs involves some affirmation.  The Pyrrhonists realised this, and therefore some of them wrote nothing, like Pyrrho, their leader, and others advocated [Greek:  aphasia][1] as one of the doctrines of their system.

    [1] Hyp. I. 192.

The very aim of Pyrrhonism was an inconsistent one. [Greek:  Ataraxia] was only another name for happiness, and in one instance, even, is given as [Greek:  hedone], and thus, in spite of themselves, the Sceptics introduced a theory of happiness.  Pyrrho, like others of his time, sought the highest good, and thought that he had found it in [Greek:  ataraxia], the peace of mind that appears in other systems of philosophy in other forms.  The difference of aim between the Pyrrhonists, Stoics, and Epicureans was more apparent than real.  To them all philosophy was a path to lead to happiness.  The method of Pyrrhonism was, however, negative.  Its strength consisted in its attacks on Dogmatism, and not in any positive aim of its own, for its positive side could not be recognised according to its own doctrines.  Therefore there was no real development in Pyrrhonism, for a negative thought cannot be developed.

We find, accordingly, from the time of Pyrrho to Sextus, no growth in breadth of philosophical outlook, only improvement in methods.  Philosophical activity can never have doubt as its aim, as that would form, as we have shown, a psychological contradiction.  The true essence of Pyrrhonism was passivity, but passivity can never lead to progress.  Much of the polemical work of Pyrrhonism prepared the way for scientific progress by providing a vast store of scientific data, but progress was to the Pyrrhonists impossible.  They sounded their own scientific death-knell by declaring the impossibility of science, and putting an end to all theories.

The life of all scientific and philosophic progress is in the attempt to find the hidden truth.  To the Sceptic there was no truth, and there could be no progress.  As progress is a law in the evolution of the human race, so Scepticism as a philosophy could never be a permanent growth, any more than asceticism in religion can be a lasting influence.  Both of them are only outgrowths.  As the foundation principles of Scepticism were opposed to anything like real growth, it was a system that could never originate anything.  Pyrrho taught from the beginning

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Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.