It is interesting to note that Sextus, in his refutation of the position that the Academy is the same as Pyrrhonism, takes up the entire development of Academic thought from the time of Plato till that of Antiochus, and does not limit the argument to Scepticism under Arcesilaus.  The claim made by some that the two schools were the same, is stated by him,[4] and the word ‘some’ probably refers to members of both schools at different periods of their history.  Sextus recognises three Academies, although he remarks that some make even a further division, calling that of Philo and Charmides, the fourth, and that of Antiochus and his followers, the fifth.

    [1] Hyp. I. 234.

    [2] Diog.  IV. 6, 33.

    [3] Hyp. I. 234.

    [4] Hyp. I. 220.

That many in the Academy, and even outside of it, regarded Plato as a Sceptic, and an authority for subsequent Scepticism, we find both from Sextus and Diogenes.[1] As Lewes justly remarks, one could well find authority for Scepticism in the works of Plato, as indeed the Academicians did, but not when the sum total of his teachings was considered.  The spirit of Plato’s teachings was dogmatic, as Sextus most decidedly recognises, and as Aenesidemus and Menodotus[2] recognised before him.[3] Sextus himself shows us that Plato’s idealism and ethical teachings can have nothing in common with Scepticism, for if he accepts the desirability of the virtuous life, and the existence of Providence, he dogmatises; and if he even regards them as probable, he gives preference to one set of ideas over another, and departs from the sceptical character.  Sextus characterises the sceptical side of Plato’s writings as mental gymnastics,[4] which do not authorise his being called a Sceptic, and affirms that Plato is not a Sceptic, since he prefers some unknown things to others in trustworthiness.  The ethical difference underlying the teachings of the Academy and Pyrrhonism, Sextus was very quick to see, and although it is very probable that the part of the Hypotyposes which defines the difference between the Academy and Pyrrhonism may be largely quoted from the introduction to Aenesidemus’ works, yet Sextus certainly gives these statements the strong stamp of his approval.  He condemns the Academy because of the theory that good and evil exist, or if this cannot be decidedly proved, yet that it is more probable that what is called good exists than the contrary.[5]

    [1] Hyp. I. 221; Diog.  IX. 11, 72.

    [2] Bekker’s edition of Hyp. I. 222.

    [3] Hyp. I. 222.

    [4] Hyp. I. 223.

    [5] Hyp.  I. 226.

The whole Academic teaching of probabilities contradicted the standpoint of the Sceptics—­that our ideas are equal as regards trustworthiness and untrustworthiness,[1] for the Academicians declared that some ideas are probable and some improbable, and they make a difference even in those ideas that they call probable.