of it given by Pyrrho must have been different.  It would seem probable that Pyrrho used all of these three sayings, from the account of Diogenes, and that even then they gave rise to the accusation of the Dogmatics, that simply by possessing such sayings the Sceptics dogmatised,[10] for the refutation of this used by Sextus occurs in the old account of the sayings, namely, that these formulae include also themselves in the meaning, as a cathartic removes itself together with other harmful objects.[11]

    [1] Compare Maccoll Op. cit. p. 21.

    [2] Diog.  IX. 11, 64.

    [3] Diog.  IX. 11, 70, 64.

    [4] Diog.  IX. 11, 69; IX. 11, 61.

    [5] Hyp. I. 202; Diog.  IX. 8, 51; Photius Bekker’s ed.
       280 H.

    [6] Photius Bekker’s ed. 280 H.

    [7] Hyp. I. 197; Diog.  IX. 11, 76.

    [8] Aristocles ap.  Eusebium, Praep.  Ev. XIV. 18.

    [9] Hyp. I. 213.

    [10] Diog.  IX. 11, 68-76.

    [11] Diog.  IX. 11, 76; Hyp. I. 206.

In comparing the later Pyrrhonism with the teachings of Pyrrho, we would sharply contrast the moral attitude of the two.  With Pyrrho equilibrium of soul was a means to be applied to his positive theory of life; with the later Pyrrhoneans it was the end to be attained.  We would attribute, however, the empirical tendency shown during the whole history of Pyrrhonism to Pyrrho as its originator.  He was an empirical philosopher, and the result of his influence in this respect, as seen in the subsequent development of the school, stands in marked contrast to the dialectic spirit of the Academic Scepsis.  The empiricism of the school is shown in its scientific lore, in the fact that so many of the Sceptics were physicians, and in the character of the ten Tropes of [Greek:  epoche].  We may safely affirm that the foundation principles of Pyrrhonism are due to Pyrrho, and the originality which gave the school its power.  The elaborated arguments, however, and the details of its formulae belong to later times.

Coming now to the relation of Pyrrhonism to the Academy, the connection between the two is difficult to exactly determine, between the time of Pyrrho and that of Aenesidemus.  Scepticism in the Academy was, however, never absolutely identical with Pyrrhonism, although at certain periods of the history of the Academy the difference was slight.  We can trace throughout the evolution of doubt, as shown to us in Pyrrhonism, and in Academic Scepticism, the different results which followed the difference in origin of the two movements, and these differences followed according to general laws of development of thought.  Arcesilaus, who introduced doubt into the Academy, claimed to return to the dialectic of Socrates, and suppressing the lectures,[1] which were the method of teaching in the later schools of philosophy, introduced discussions