Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 167 pages of information about Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.

Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 167 pages of information about Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.

    [1] De orat. III, 62.

    [2] Diog.  IX. 11, 61.

    [3] Compare Natorp Op. cit. p. 71.

    [4] Zeller Grundriss der Griechischen Phil. p. 70.

The essence of Pyrrhonism as given by Timon is as follows:[1] Man desires to be happy.  To realise his desire he must consider three things: 

  (i) What is the nature of things?

 (ii) How should man conduct himself in relation to
      them?

(iii) What is the result to him of this relation?

The nature of things is unknown.  Our relation to them must be one of suspension of judgment, without activity, desire, or belief,—­that is, an entirely negative relation.  The result is that state of having no opinion, called [Greek:  epoche], which is followed in turn by [Greek:  ataraxia].

    [1] Aristocles ap.  Eusebium Praep.  Ev. XIV. 18.

[1]The problem of philosophy is here proposed very nearly in the terms of Kant, but not with the positive motive, like that of the great philosopher of Germany, of evolving a system to present the truth.  Yet the importance of these questions shows the originality of Pyrrho.  The earnestness of Pyrrho is further shown by an example given by Diogenes.  Once on being found talking to himself alone, he said, when asked the reason, that he was meditating how to become a good man ([Greek:  chrestos]),[2] thus showing an entirely different spirit from anything found in Sextus’ books.  The explanation of his life and teachings is to be found largely in his own disposition.  Such an attitude of indifference must belong to a placid nature, and cannot be entirely the result of a philosophical system, and, while it can be aimed at, it can never be perfectly imitated.  One of his disciples recognised this, and said that it was necessary to have the disposition of Pyrrho in order to hold his doctrines.[3] Diogenes tells us that he was the first to advance any formulae of Scepticism,[4] but they must have been very elementary, as Pyrrho himself wrote nothing.  We find no trace of formulated Tropes in Pyrrho’s teachings, yet it is probable that he indicated some of the contradictions in sensation, and possibly the Tropes in some rudimentary form.  Of the large number of sceptical formulae, or [Greek:  phonai], the three which seem to have the oldest connection with Scepticism are the [Greek:  antilogia], the [Greek:  ouden horizo], and the [Greek:  ou mallon].[5] We know from Diogenes that Protagoras is the authority for saying that in regard to everything there are two opposing arguments.[6] The saying “to determine nothing” is quoted from Timon’s Python by Diogenes,[7] and the other two mentioned are also attributed to him by Aristocles.[8] We have also in the [Greek:  ou mallon] a direct connection with Democritus, although the difference in the meaning which he attributed to it is shown by Sextus.[9] So while the expression is the same, the explanation

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Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.