Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 167 pages of information about Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.

Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 167 pages of information about Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism.
in appearance, that is, applicable to phenomena.  The Heraclitism of Aenesidemus would be then only in appearance, as he understood the statement, that “Contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing,” only in the phenomenal sense.[1] Hirzel says in addition, that contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to those phenomena which are the same for all, and consequently true, for Aenesidemus considered those phenomena true that are the same for all.[2] As Protagoras, the disciple of Heraclitus, declared the relative character of sensations, that things exist only for us, and that their nature depends on our perception of them; so, in the phenomenal sense, Aenesidemus accepts the apparent fact that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing.

    [1] Natorp Op. cit. 115, 122.

    [2] Adv.  Math. VIII. 8; Hirzel Op. cit. p. 95.

This explanation entirely overlooks the fact that we have to do with the word [Greek:  huparchein], in the statement that contradictory predicates in reality apply to the same thing; while in the passage quoted where Aenesidemus declares common phenomena to be true ones, we have the word [Greek:  alethe], so that this explanation of the difficulty would advocate a very strange use of the word [Greek:  huparchein].

All of these different views of the possible solution of this perplexing problem are worthy of respect, as the opinion of men who have given much thought to this and other closely Belated subjects.  While we may not altogether agree with any one of them, they nevertheless furnish many suggestions, which are very valuable in helping to construct a theory on the subject that shall satisfactorily explain the difficulties, and present a consistent view of the attitude of Aenesidemus.

First, in regard to the Greek expression [Greek:  hoi peri] in connection with proper names, upon which Pappenheim bases so much of his argument.  All Greek scholars would agree that the expression does not apply usually only to the disciples of any teacher, but [Greek:  hoi peri ton Ainesidemon], for instance, includes Aenesidemus with his followers, and is literally translated, “Aenesidemus and his followers.”  It is noticeable, however, in the writings of Sextus that he uses the expression [Greek:  hoi peri] often for the name of the founder of a school alone, as Pappenheim himself admits.[1] We find examples of this in the mention of Plato and Democritus and Arcesilaus, as [Greek:  hoi peri ton Platona kai Demokriton][2] and [Greek:  hoi peri ton Arkesilaon],[3] and accordingly we have no right to infer that his use of the name Aenesidemus in this way has an exceptional significance.  It may mean Aenesidemus alone, or it may signify Aenesidemus in connection with his followers.

    [1] Pappenheim Op. cit. p. 21.

    [2] Adv.  Math. VIII. 6.

    [3] Adv.  Math. VII. 150.

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Sextus Empiricus and Greek Scepticism from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.