Pappenheim advances the theory that some of these contemporaries against whom Sextus directed his arguments had written a book entitled [Greek:  Ainesidemos kath’ Herakleiton], to prove the harmony between Aenesidemus and Heraclitus, and that it was from this book that Sextus quoted the dogmatic statements which he introduced with that formula.  He claims, further, that the passage quoted from Hypotyposes I. even, is directed against contemporaries, who founded their system of proofs of the harmony between Aenesidemus and Heraclitus on the connection of the celebrated formula which was such a favourite with the Sceptics:  “Contrary predicates appear to apply to the same thing,” with the apparent deduction from this, that “Contrary predicates in reality apply to the same thing.”  Sextus wishes, according to Pappenheim, to prove to these contemporaries that they had misunderstood Aenesidemus, and Sextus does not report Aenesidemus to be a Dogmatic, nor to have taught the doctrines of Heraclitus; neither has he misunderstood Aenesidemus, nor consequently misrepresented him; but on the contrary, these dogmatic quotations have nothing to do with Aenesidemus, but refer altogether to contemporaries who pretended to be Sceptics while they accepted the teachings of Heraclitus.  Sextus naturally warmly combats this tendency, as he wishes to preserve Pyrrhonism pure.

Brochard advocates a change of opinion on the part of Aenesidemus as an explanation of the difficulty in question.[1] He starts from the supposition, the reasonableness of which we shall consider later, that Aenesidemus had passed through one change of opinion already when he severed his connection with the New Academy; and to the two phases of his life, which such a change has already made us familiar with, he adds a third.  Aenesidemus would not be the first who has accepted different beliefs at different periods of his life, and Brochard claims that such a development in the opinions of Aenesidemus is logical.  He does not accuse Aenesidemus of having, as might seem from the perusal of Sextus, suddenly changed his basis, but rather of having gradually come to accept much in the teachings of Heraclitus.  Aenesidemus modifies his Scepticism only to the extent of pretending to know something of absolute reality.  The Sceptic says, “Contradictory predicates are apparently applicable to the same thing,” and Aenesidemus accepts the Heraclitan result—­“Contradictory predicates are in reality applicable to the same thing.”  From Sextus’ report, Aenesidemus would seem to have renounced his position as a Sceptic in saying that Scepticism is the path to the philosophy of Heraclitus.  He does not, however, renounce Scepticism, but he finds it incomplete.  In deliberating concerning the appearance of contradictory predicates in regard to the same object, he would naturally ask, “Whence come these contradictory appearances?” After having doubted all things, he wished to know wherefore he doubts.  The system of Heraclitus offers a solution, and he accepts it.  Contradictory predicates produce equilibrium in the soul because they are an expression of reality.