[1] Hyp. I. 124.
[2] Hyp. I. 125.
[3] Hyp. I. 126.
[4] See Index to Bekker’s edition of Sextus.
[5] Papp. Er. Pyr. Gr. p. 55.
[6] Hyp. I. 128.
[7] Hyp. I. 128.
[8] Diog. VII. 1, 159.
[9] Hyp. I. 128.
[10] Adv. Math. VII. 313.
The Seventh Trope. This Trope, based upon the quantities and compositions of objects, is illustrated by examples of different kinds of food, drink, and medicine, showing the different effects according to the quantity taken, as the harmfulness and the usefulness of most things depend on their quantity. Things act differently upon the senses if applied in small or large quantities, as filings of metal or horn, and separate grains of sand have a different color and touch from the same taken in the form of a solid.[1] The result is that ideas vary according to the composition of the object, and this Trope also brings to confusion the existence of outward objects, and leads us to reserve our opinion in regard to them.[2] This Trope is illustrated by Diogenes with exceeding brevity.[3]
[1] Hyp. I. 129-131.
[2] Hyp. I. 134.
[3] Diog. IX. 11, 86.
The Eighth Trope. The Trope based upon relation contains, as Sextus rightly remarks, the substance of the other nine,[1] for the general statement of the relativity of knowledge includes the other statements made. The prominence which Sextus gave this Trope in his introduction to the ten Tropes leads one to expect here new illustrations and added[2] arguments for [Greek: epoche]. We find, however, neither of these, but simply a statement that all things are in relation in one of two ways, either directly, or as being a part of a difference. These two kinds of relation are given by Protagoras, and might have been used to good purpose in the introduction to the Tropes, or at the end, to prove that all the others were really subordinate to the eighth. The reasoning is, however simply applied to the relation of objects to each other, and nothing is added that is not found elsewhere where as an argument for [Greek: epoche].[3] This Trope is the tenth by Diogenes, and he strengthens his reasoning in regard to it, by a statement that Sextus does not directly make, i.e., that everything is in relation to the understanding.[4]