[3] Hyp. I. 22; Diog.  IX. 11, 105.

    [4] Hyp. I. 22.

    [5] Hyp. I. 23.

    [6] Hyp. I. 24.

The aim of Pyrrhonism was ataraxia in those things which pertain to opinion, and moderation in the things which life imposes.[1] In other words, we find here the same natural desire of the human being to rise above and beyond the limitations which pain and passion impose, which is expressed in other forms, and under other names, in other schools of philosophy.  The method, however, by which ataraxia or peace of mind could be reached, was peculiar to the Sceptic.  It is a state of psychological equilibrium, which results from the equality of the weight of different arguments that are opposed to each other, and the consequent impossibility of affirming in regard to either one, that it is correct.[2] The discovery of ataraxia was, in the first instance, apparently accidental, for while the Sceptic withheld his opinion, unable to decide what things were true, and what things were false, ataraxia fortunately followed.[3] After he had begun to philosophize, with a desire to discriminate in regard to ideas, and to separate the true from the false[4] during the time of [Greek:  epoche], or suspension of judgement, ataraxia followed as if by chance, as the shadow follows the body.[5]

    [1] Hyp. I. 25.

    [2] Hyp. I. 26.

    [3] Hyp. I. 26.

    [4] Diog.  IX. 11, 107.

    [5] Hyp. I. 29.

The Sceptic in seeking ataraxia in the things of opinion, does not entirely escape from suffering from his sensations.  He is not wholly undisturbed, for he is sometimes cold and hungry, and so on.[1] He claims, nevertheless, that he suffers less than the dogmatist, who is beset with two kinds of suffering, one from the feelings themselves, and also from the conviction that they are by nature an evil.[2] To the Sceptic nothing is in itself either an evil or a good, and so he thinks that “he escapes from difficulties easier."[3] For instance, he who considers riches a good in themselves, is unhappy in the loss of them, and in possession of them is in fear of losing them, while the Sceptic, remembering the Sceptical saying “No more,” is untroubled in whatever condition he may be found, as the loss of riches is no more an evil than the possession of them is a good.[4] For he who considers anything good or bad by nature is always troubled, and when that which seemed good is not present with him, he thinks that he is tortured by that which is by nature bad, and follows after what he thinks to be good.  Having acquired it, however, he is not at rest, for his reason tells him that a sudden change may deprive him of this thing that he considers a good.[5] The Sceptic, however, endeavours neither to avoid nor seek anything eagerly.[6]

    [1] Hyp. I. 30.

    [2] Hyp. I. 30.