Despite the great gulf normally fixed, however, between the engineer and the inventor, most of the definite progress of the world for the past one hundred years has been done by the co-ordination of the two; a co-ordination accomplished by “the man of business.”

Now the inventor and engineer type do not exist only in the world of engineering and mechanics, though it is in that world that they are the most clearly recognized; for they exist in all walks of life.  In literature, inventors write novels; in business life, they project railroads; in strategy, they map out new lines of effort.  In literature, the engineer writes cyclopaedias; in business, he makes the projected railroads a success; in strategy, he works out logistics and does the quantitative work.

In that part of strategy of which we are now thinking—­the designing of the naval machine—­the inventor and the engineer clearly have two separate lines of work:  one line the conceiving, and the other line the constructing, of strategic and tactical methods, and of material instruments to carry out those methods.  Clearly, these two lines of work while independent are mutually dependent; and, if properly carried out are mutually assistant.  The coworking of the inventor and the engineer is a little like that coworking of theory and practice, which has been the principal factor in bringing about the present amazing condition of human society commonly called “Modern Civilization.”

The shortcomings of human speech are most evident in discussing complicated matters; and for this reason speech is supplemented in the engineering arts by drawings of different kinds.  No man ever lived who could describe a complicated machine accurately to a listener, unless that machine differed but little from a machine with which the listener was acquainted.  But hand a drawing of even a very complicated machine to a man who knows its language—­and the whole nature of the object is laid bare to him; not only its general plan and purpose, but its details, with all their dimensions and even the approximate weights.  So, when the forces representing a complicated naval situation are placed upon the game-board, all the elements of the problem appear clearly and correctly to each person; the imagination has little work to do, and the chance for misunderstanding is almost negligible.  Of course, this does not mean that the game-board can decide questions with absolute finality.  It cannot do this; but that is only because conditions are represented with only approximate realism, because the rules of the game may not be quite correct, and because sufficient correct data cannot be procured.  The difficulties of securing absolute realism are of course insuperable, and the difficulties of getting absolutely correct data are very great.  The more, however, this work is prosecuted, the more clearly its difficulties will be indicated, and therefore the more effectively the remedies can be provided.  The more the game-board is used both on ship and shore, the more ease will be found in getting correct data for it, and the more correctly conclusions can then be deduced.