education, co-operation with the army, and the size of fleet required to carry out the policy of the nation—­but also as to the composition of the fleet, relative proportions of vessels of the various types, and the characteristics of each type.  Nothing was left to chance; nothing was decided by guessing; no one man’s dictum was accepted.  The whole problem was attacked in its entirety, and a general solution found; and after this, the various divisions and subdivisions of the problem were attacked and solved, in obedience to the same principles, in accordance with the results obtained at Kriegspiel.

If a very large and complicated engine of new pattern is to be built by any engineering company, no casting of the smallest kind is made until general plans have been outlined, detailed plans prepared from these, and then “working plans” made for the workmen.  From the working plans, the workmen construct the various parts; sometimes in number several hundred.  Finally, the whole intricate machine is put together, and the motive power applied.  Then all the parts, great and small, begin their allotted tasks, each part perfectly adapted to its work, not too large and not too small; all working together in apparent confusion, but in obedience to law—­fulfilling exactly the will of the designing engineer.  So, the vast and new machine of the German navy was designed in the drafting-room of the Kriegspiel; and though it has been gradually strengthened and enlarged since then, each strengthening piece and each addition has been designed in accordance with the original plan, and has therefore harmonized with the original machine.  Thus the navy has expanded smoothly, symmetrically, purposefully.  No other result was to be expected:  the strategy having been correct, the result was correct also.

Perhaps one contributing factor to the success of the German navy has been her staff of officers highly trained in strategy by Kriegspiel, that insures not only sound advice in general, but also insures that at any time, night or day, a body of competent officers shall be ready at the admiralty to decide what action should be taken, whenever any new situation is reported.  This factor is most important; because in naval and military operations, even in time of peace, but especially in war, events follow each other so rapidly, and momentous crises develop so suddenly, that the demand for action that shall be both wise and instantaneous is imperative.  The chess-player can linger long over his decisions, because his opponent cannot make his next move meanwhile; but in warfare no such rule or condition can exist.  In war, time is as vital a factor as any other:  and the strategist, who, like Napoleon, can think faster and decide more quickly and accurately than his antagonist is, ceteris paribus, sure to win; and even if ceteris are not quite paribus, his superior quickness and correctness will overcome great handicaps in material and personnel, as the lives of all the great strategists in history, especially Alexander and Napoleon, prove convincingly.  To bring a preponderating force to bear at a given point ahead of the enemy—­to move the maximum of force with the maximum of celerity—­has always been the aim of strategy:  and probably it always will be, for the science of strategy rests on principles, and principles never change.