In the “Estimate of the Situation” method, on the other hand, the orator has no opportunity, because the procedure is simply an accurate process of reasoning.  It is divided into four parts.  The first part consists of a careful study of the “mission,” ending in a clear determination of what the “mission” really is—­that is, what is the thing which it is desired to do? The second part consists of a careful study, and eventually a clear comprehension, of the difficulties in the way; the third part consists of a careful study, and eventually a clear comprehension, of what facilities are available with which to overcome the difficulties; the fourth part consists of a careful study of the mission, difficulties and facilities, in their mutual relations, and a “decision” as to what should therefore be done.

Military and naval people are so thoroughly convinced of the value of this method that they always employ it when making important decisions, writing down the various factors and the successive steps in regular order and in complete detail.

In this country, while naval and military people use this method in their comparatively minor problems, the country at large does not use it in deciding the major problem—­that is, in deciding how much navy they want, and of what composition.  They do not take even the first step toward formulating a naval policy, because they do not study the “mission” of the navy—­that is, they do not study the international and national situations and their bearing on the need for a navy.  Yet until they do this they will not be in a sufficiently informed condition of mind to determine what the “mission” is—­that is, what they wish the navy to be able to do—­because, before they can formulate the mission they must resolve what foreign navy or navies that mission must include.  If they decide that the mission of the navy is to guard our coast and trade routes against the hostile efforts of Liberia the resulting naval policy will be simple and inexpensive; while if they conclude that the mission of our navy is to guard our coast and trade routes against the hostile acts of any navy the resulting naval policy will be so difficult and costly as to tax the brain and wealth of the country to a degree that will depend on the length of time that will elapse before the date at which the navy must be ready to fulfil that mission.

This factor reminds us of another factor:  the minimum time in which the navy can get ready to fulfil a given mission (for instance, to protect us against any navy); and we cannot decide the mission correctly without taking this factor into account.  For example, it would be foolish to decide that the mission of our navy is to protect us now against any navy, including the greatest, when it would take us at least twenty years to develop and train a navy to accomplish that task; and it would be equally foolish to decide that the mission is to protect us against any navy except the greatest, because such a decision could rest on no other ground than present improbability of conflict with the greatest navy, or improbability for the very few years ahead (say two or three) which we poor mortals can forecast.