The construction of the material of the navy has progressed since then, but spasmodically.  At every session of Congress tremendous efforts have been made by people desiring an adequate navy, and tremendous resistance has been made by people who believed that we required no navy, or at least only a little navy.  The country at large has taken a bystander’s interest in the contest, not knowing much about the pros and cons, but feeling in an indolent fashion that we needed some navy, though not much.  The result has been, not a reasonable policy, but a succession of unreasonable compromises between the aims of the extremists on both sides.

Great Britain, on the other hand, has always regarded the navy question as one of the most difficult and important before the country, and has adopted, and for centuries has maintained, a definite naval policy.  This does not mean that she has followed a rigid naval policy; for a naval policy, to be efficient, must be able to accommodate itself quickly to rapid changes in international situations, and to meet sudden dangers from even unexpected quarters—­as the comparatively recent experience of Great Britain shows.  At the beginning of this century the British navy was at the height of its splendor and self-confidence.  Britannia ruled the waves, and Britannia’s ships and squadrons enforced Britannia’s policies in every sea.  The next most powerful navy was that of France; but it was not nearly so large, and seemed to be no more efficient, in proportion to its size.  Owing to Britain’s wise and continuing policy, and the excellence of the British sailor and his ships, the British navy proudly and almost tranquilly held virtual command of all the seas.

But shortly after this century began, British officers discerned a new and disturbing element gradually developing on the horizon.  The first thing which roused their attention to it was the unexpected attack of the Japanese torpedo-boats on the Russian squadron in Port Arthur.  No war had been declared, and the Russian squadron was riding peacefully at anchor.  The suddenness of the attack, and the distinct though incomplete success which it achieved, startled the British into a realization of the fact that there had been introduced into warfare on the sea methods and tactics requiring a higher order of preparation than had ever before been known; that the scientific methods which the Germans employed so effectively on land in 1870 had been adapted by the Japanese to naval warfare, and would necessitate the introduction into naval policies of speedier methods than had hitherto been needed.