to fight; and in cases where two forces of widely differing strength have fought, the situation has usually been brought about directly by a superior intelligence.  In fact, one of the most frequent and important endeavors of strategy and tactics—­used triumphantly by Napoleon—­has always been such a handling of one’s forces as to be superior to the enemy at the point of contact—­to “get the mostest men there the firstest,” as General Forrest is said to have expressed it.

The effect of superior-trained intelligence is greatest “at the top,” but it can accomplish little unless a fine intelligence permeates the whole.  A fine intelligence at the top will so direct the men below, will so select men for the various posts, and will so co-ordinate their efforts, that the organization will resemble a veritable organism:  all the various organs fulfilling separately yet accurately their allotted functions; all the fire-control parties, all the gun crews, all the torpedo crews, all the engineer forces properly organized and drilled; all the hulls of the vessels, all the guns, all the torpedoes, all the multifarious engines, machines, and instruments in good material condition and correctly adjusted for use.

But it is not only in the actual battle that fine intelligence is required; it is required long before the battle and far distant from the scene—­in the “admiralty” at home.  The Japanese fleet set out fully manned with a highly trained, enthusiastic, and confident personnel; the Russian fleet set out manned with a poorly trained and discouraged personnel, only too well aware of their defects.  The issue at Tsushima was decided before the respective fleets left their respective homes—­though that issue was not then known to mortals.  The battle emphasized, but did not prove, what had been proved a hundred times before:  the paramount importance of preparedness; that when two forces fight—­the actual battle merely secures the decision as to the relative values of two completed machines, and their degrees of preparedness for use.

Preparedness of material is not, of course, so important as preparedness of personnel, because if the personnel is prepared, they will inevitably prepare the material.  And the preparedness must pervade all grades:  for while it is true that the preparedness of those in high command is more important than the preparedness of those in minor posts, yet there is no post so lowly that its good or its ill performance will not be a factor in the net result.  An unskilful oiler may cause a hot bearing that will slow down a battleship, and put out of order the column of a squadron; a signalman’s mistake may throw a fleet into confusion.