the War Department and some generals.  That a situation equally grave did not exist between the head of the Navy Department and any of the admirals may be attributed to the fact that the number of naval defeats was less than the number of defeats on land, to the lesser number of persons in the navy, and to the smaller number of operations.  Perhaps a still greater reason was the greater confidence shown by civilians in their ability to handle troops, compared with their confidence in their ability to handle fleets.

Even between the Navy Department and the officers, however, mutual respect and understanding can hardly be said to have existed.  This did not prevent the ultimate triumph of the Union navy; but that could hardly have been prevented by any means, since the Union navy was so much superior to the Confederate.

Co-operation between the Navy Department and the Fleet.—­In any war with a powerful navy, into which the U. S. navy may enter, the question of co-operation between the department and the fleet will be the most important factor in the portentous situation that will face us.  We shall be confronted with the necessity of handling the most complex and powerful machine known to man with the utmost possible skill; and any lack of understanding between the fleet and the department, and any slowness of apprehension or of action by the department, may cause a national disaster.  One of the most important dangers to be guarded against will be loss of time.  In naval operations the speed of movement of the forces is so great that crises develop and pass with a rapidity unexampled formerly; so that delays of any kind, or due to any causes, must be prevented if that be possible.  If a swordsman directs a thrust at the heart, the thrust must be parried—­in time.

[Illustration:  STRATEGIC MAP OF THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS.]