In the case of operations carried on far away from the bases of both fleets, operations like those that the French and British carried on in the West Indies, the commanders-in-chief will naturally be much less directed by the admiralties at home than will a commander-in-chief operating near home; and the strategical advantage, as affected by the proximity of bases, and by the possession of the better chance for the initiative, will be reduced to its minimum.

Of course, the victory will go to the more powerful force; but so many factors go to make up power, that it may be difficult to determine which is the more powerful, until after victory itself shall have decided it.  Supposing the skill to be equal on both sides, the victory will go to the side that possesses the most numerous and powerful vessels of all kinds.  But unless there is a very great disproportion, it may be difficult to determine which side has the more powerful ships, even though we may know which side has the more numerous.  It is extremely difficult to compare even two single war-ships because we do not know the relative values of their factors.  Suppose two ships, for instance, to be equal in all ways, except that one ship has ten 14-inch guns, and the other has twelve 12-inch guns of higher initial velocity.  Which is the more powerful ship?  Suppose one ship has more armor, another more speed.  Formulae designed to assign numerical values to fighting ships have been laboriously worked out, notably by Constructor Otto Kretschmer of the German navy; but the results cannot be accepted as anything except very able approximations.  Furthermore, if ship A could whip ship B under some conditions, B could whip A under other conditions.  An extreme illustration would be battleship A engaged with submarine B at close quarters; B being on the surface in one case, and submerged in the other case.

Aircraft.—­The influence of aircraft on naval operations is to be very great indeed, but in directions and by amounts that it would not be wise to attempt to predict.  The most obvious influence will be in distant scouting, for which the great speed of aircraft will make them peculiarly adapted, as was demonstrated in the battle near the Skagerak.  It is the belief of the author, however, that the time is close at hand when aeroplanes and dirigibles of large size will be capable of offensive operations of the highest order, including the launching of automobile torpedoes of the Whitehead type.

Skill.—­The question of skill bears a relation to the question of the material power directed by it that is very vital, but very elusive.  If, for instance, ship C, firing ten 12-inch guns on a side, fights ship D, firing five like guns on a side, the advantage would seem to be with C; but it would not be if each gun on D made three hits, while each gun on C made one hit; a relative performance not at all impossible