Before attempting the solution of a strategic problem by an entire naval force, however, it is usual to hold mobilization exercises of a character less complete, in the same way that any course of training begins with drills that are easy and progresses to drills that are difficult.  The simplest of all the preparative drills—­if drills they correctly can be called—­is the periodical reporting, once a month, or once a quarter, by each bureau and office, of its state of readiness; the report to be in such detail as experience shows to be the best.

In the days when each bureau’s preparation consisted of comparatively few things to do, the chief of that bureau could be relied on to do the things required to be done by his bureau; and his oral assurance to the secretary that—­say all the ships had enough ammunition, or that adequate provision had been made for coal, or that there were enough enlisted men—­would fulfil all requirements.  But in the past fifty years, the requirements have increased a hundredfold, while the human mind has remained just as it was.  So it has seemed necessary to institute a system of periodical preparation reports, to examine them carefully, and to use all possible vigilance, lest any item be forgotten or any work done by two bureaus that ought to be done by only one.

Who should examine the reports?  Naturally the same persons as decide what should be done.  The same studies and deliberations that fit a person to decide what is needed, fit him to inspect the product that is offered to supply the need; not only to see if it comes up to the specifications, but also to decide whether or not any observed omission is really important; to decide whether, in view of certain practical difficulties, the specifications may be modified; and also to decide whether certain improvements suggested by any bureau should or should not be adopted.

This procedure may seem to put the strategy officers “over” the technical officers, to put a lieutenant-commander on the General Staff “over” a rear admiral who is chief of bureau; but such an idea seems hardly justified.  In any well-designed organization relative degrees of official superiority are functions of rank, and of nothing else; superiority in rank must, of course, be recognized, for the reason that when on duty together the junior must obey the senior.  But even this superiority is purely official; it is a matter of position, and not a matter of honor.  All the honor that is connected with any position is not by reason of the position itself, but by reason of the honorable service which a man must have rendered in order to attain it, and which he must continue to render in order to maintain it.  So, in a Navy Department, the General Staff officers cannot be “over” the bureau officers, unless by law or regulation certain of the staff are made to rank over certain bureau officers.  A procedure like this would seem to be unnecessary, except in the case of the chief of staff himself, who might, for the purpose of prompt administration, be placed by law over the bureau chiefs.