known to itself, that the enemy should be defeated by the use of a certain method, then that should be stated also.  Maybe it would not be wise for the department to state the method the employment of which is desired; maybe the commander-in-chief would be the best judge of the method to be employed.  But maybe circumstances of governmental policy dictate the employment of a certain method, even if militarily it is not the best; and maybe also the department might prefer that method by reason of information recently received, which it does not have time to communicate in full.

Now, if it is desirable for the department to give the commander-in-chief instructions, running the risk of invading his “area of discretion,” and of doing other disadvantageous things, it is obvious that the department should be thoroughly equipped for doing it successfully.  This means that the department should be provided not only with the most efficient radio apparatus that can be secured, manned, of course, by the most skilful operators, but also with a body of officers capable of handling that particular part of the Navy Department’s work which is the concentrated essence of all its work, the actual handling of the naval forces.  The usual name given to such a body of officers is “General Staff.”

Such bodies of officers have been developed in navies in recent years, by a desire to take advantage of electrical appliances which greatly increase the accuracy and rapidity of communication over long distances.  In days not long ago, before communication by radio was developed, commanders on the spot were in possession of much more information about events in their vicinity, compared with the Navy Department, than they are now; and the difficulties and uncertainties of communication made it necessary to leave much more to their discretion and initiative.  The President of the United States can now by telephone talk to the commander-in-chief, when he is in home waters, and every day sees some improvement in this line.  This facility of communication carries with it, of course, the danger of “interfering,” one of the most frequent causes of trouble in the past, in conducting the operations of both armies and fleets—­a danger very real, very insidious, and very important.  The very ease with which interference can be made, the trained instinct of the subordinate to follow the wishes of his superior if he can, the temptation to the superior to wield personally some military power and get some military glory, conspire to bring about interference.  This is only an illustration, however, of the well-known fact that every power can be used for evil as well as for good, and is not a valid argument against developing to the utmost the communication between the department and the fleet.  It is, however, a very valid argument against developing it unless there be developed simultaneously some means like a “safety device” for preventing or at least discouraging its misuse.