Owing to the fact that the commander-in-chief and all his personnel are, by the nature of the conditions surrounding them, on executive duty, the working out of the end in view of any extensive drills seems the task of the Navy Department; while the task of attaining it seems to belong to the commander-in-chief.  Owing to the present stage of electrical progress, the Navy Department has better means of ascertaining the whole naval situation than has the commander-in-chief, and if officers (General Staff) be stationed at the department to receive and digest all the information received, and decide on the best procedure in each contingency as it arises, the Navy Department can then give the commander-in-chief the information he requires and general instructions how to proceed.

This does not mean that the department would “interfere” with the commander-in-chief, but simply that it would assist him.  The area of discretion of the commander-in-chief should not be invaded; for if it be invaded, not only may orders be given without knowledge of certain facts in the commander-in-chief’s possession, but the commander-in-chief will have his difficulties increased by the very people who are trying to help him.  He may be forced into disobeying orders, a most disturbing thing to have to do; and he will surely be placed in a position of continuous doubt as to what is expected of him.

Of course, it must be realized that the difficulties of co-operating with a commander-in-chief at sea, by means of even the most expert General Staff, are of the highest order.  It is hard to imagine any task more difficult.  It must be accomplished, however, or else there will be danger all the time that the commander-in-chief will act as he would not act if he had all the information that the department had.  This suggests at once that the proper office of the department is merely to give the commander-in-chief information and let him act on his own judgment.  True in a measure; but the commander-in-chief must be given some instructions, even if they be general, for the reason that the commander-in-chief is merely an instrument for enforcing a certain policy.  Clearly, he must know what the policy is, what the department desires; and the mere statement of the department’s desires is of itself an order.  If it is admitted that the commander-in-chief is to carry out the orders of the department, it remains merely to decide in how great detail those orders ought to be.

No general answer can be given to the question:  “In what detail shall the orders be?” The general statement can be made, however, that the instructions should be confined as closely as practicable to a statement of the department’s desires, and that this statement should be as clear as possible.  If, for instance, the only desire of the department is that the enemy’s fleet shall be defeated, no amplification of this statement is required.  But if the department should desire, for reasons best