It is a defect of the historical system that it tends to make men do as people in the past have done—­to make them work by rule.  Clerk’s method took no note of what had been done before, but confined itself to working out what should be done at the moment (that is, by what we now call the “applicatory method"), taking account of conditions as they are.  By combining the two methods, as all war colleges do now, officers get the good results of both.

In the studies and exercises at the war colleges, note is taken of the great events that have gone by, and of the great problems now presented; by studying the historical events, and by solving war problems of the present, a certain knowledge of the science of naval strategy, and a certain skill in the art are gained.  The studies and the problems naturally are of war situations.

Yet every war situation was the result of measures taken in time of peace.  If these measures had been unwise on the part of one side—­say Blue—­in the design of certain craft, or the adoption, or failure of adoption, of certain plans, then Blue’s strategic situation in the war would be more unfavorable than it would have been if the measures had been wise.

This proves that it is not only in war that strategy should be consulted; that strategy should be made to perform important services in peace as well; that strategic considerations should be the guide to all measures great and small, that not only the major operations in war, but also the minor preparations in peace, should be conducted in accordance with the principles of strategy, and conform to its requirements.  By this means, and by this means only, does a system of preparation seem possible in which all shall prepare with the same end in view, and in which, therefore, the best results will be secured in the least time and with the least labor.

The naval machine having been designed, the various parts having been furnished by the administrative agencies directing personnel and material, and the consumable stores having been provided by the agencies of supply (all under the guidance and control of strategy, and in accordance with the calculations of logistics), the next step is the same as that with any other machine—­to prepare the machine to do its work.

The work that strategy has to do in accomplishing the preparation is only in planning; but this planning is not limited to general planning, for it extends to planning every procedure of training and administration, no matter how great or how small.  It plans the mobilization of the navy as a whole, the exercises of the fleet, the training of officers and men to insure that the plans for mobilization and fleet exercises shall be efficiently carried out, the exercises of the various craft, and of the various mechanisms of all kinds in those craft, and even the drills of the officers and men, that insure that the various craft and mechanisms shall be handled well.  This does