degree of analogy between the universe and a piece of human workmanship; but the argument itself needs a scientific survey of the entire phenomena of nature, both matter and mind.  Our Bridgewater Treatises proceeded upon this view; they embraced the consideration of the whole circle of the sciences, as bearing on the theological argument.  The scheme was so far just and to the purpose; the obvious drawback to the value of the Treatises lay in their being special pleadings, backed by a fee of a thousand pounds to each writer for maintaining one side.  If a similar fee had been given to nine equally able writers to represent the other side, the argument from design would have been far more satisfactorily sifted than by the exclusively metaphysical criticism of Kant.

When theology is supported exclusively by such doctrines as—­an independent and immaterial soul, a special moral faculty, and what is called free-will,—­the metaphysician is a person of importance in the contest; he is powerful either to uphold or to subvert the fabric.  But, if these were ever to constitute the chief stronghold of the faith, its tenure would not be very secure.  It is only a metaphysician, however, that believes or disbelieves in metaphysical grounds alone; such a man as Cousin, no doubt, rests his whole spiritual philosophy on this foundation.  But the great mass will either adhere to religion in spite of metaphysical difficulties, or else abandon it notwithstanding its metaphysical evidences.  An eminent man now departed said in my hearing, that he was a believer in Christianity until he became acquainted with geology, when, finding the first chapter of Genesis at variance with geological doctrines, he applied to the Bible the rule falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, and thenceforth abandoned his old belief.  I never heard of any one that was so worked upon by a purely metaphysical argument.

The aspect of theological doctrine that has come most to the front of late is the question of the Divine goodness, as shown in the plan of the universe.  Speculations are divided between optimism and pessimism.  How shall we decide between these extremes, or, if repudiating both, how shall we fix the mean?  Is a metaphysician more especially qualified to find out the truth?  I hardly think so.  I believe he could contribute, with others, to such a solution as may be possible.  He has, we shall suppose, surveyed closely the compass of the human sensibilities, and is able to assign, with more than common precision, what things operate on them favourably or unfavourably.  So far good.  Then, as a logician, he is more expert at detecting bad inferences in regard to the form of reasoning; but whether certain allegations of fact are well or ill founded, he may not be able to say, at least out of his own department.  If a mixed commission of ten were nominated to adjudicate upon this vast problem, metaphysics might claim to be represented by two.

[FILLING THE THEOLOGICAL VOID.]