cannot be exempted from the fallacy of self-contradiction.  Differences of condition are made by differences in the degree of honour thereto attached.  If every man that did his work well were put on a level, in point of honour, with every other man that did the same; if the gatekeeper of a mansion, by being unfailingly punctual in opening the gate, were to be equally honoured with a great leader of the House of Commons, then, indeed, equality of pay would be the only thing wanted to abolish all differences of condition.  There is, no doubt, in society, a quantity of misplaced honour; but so long as there are employments exceptionally arduous, and virtues signally beneficent in their operation, honour is a legitimate spur and reward, and should be graduated according to the desert in each case.

In spurring the ardour of youth to studious exertion, it is common to repeat the Homeric maxim, “to supplant every one else, and stand out first”.  The stimulating effect is undoubted; it is strong rhetorical brandy.  Yet only one man can be first, and the exhortation is given simultaneously to a thousand.[5]

[JUSTICE ADMIRABLE ONLY IF RECIPROCATED.]

In the discussion and inculcation of the moral duties and virtues, there has been, in all ages, a tendency to suppress correlative facts, and to affirm unconditionally what is true only with a condition.  Thus, the admirable nature of Justice, and the happiness of the Just man, are a proper theme to be extolled with all the power of eloquence.  It has been so with every civilized people, pagan as well as Christian.  In the dialogues of Plato, justice is a prominent subject, and is adorned with the full splendour of his genius.  Aristotle, in one of the few moments when he rises to poetry, pronounces justice “greater than the evening-star or the morning-star”.  Now all this panegyric is admissible only on the supposition of reciprocal justice.  Plato, indeed, had the hardihood to say that the just man is happy in himself, and by reason of his justice, even although others are unjust to him; but the position is untenable.  A man is happy in his justice if it procure for him justice in return; as a citizen is happy in his civil obedience, if it gain him protection in return.  There are two parties in the case, and the moralist should obtain access to both; he should induce the one to fulfil his share before promising to the other the happiness of justice and obedience.  It may be rhetorical, but it is not true, that justice will make a man happy in a society where it is not reciprocated.  Justice, in these circumstances, is highly noble, praiseworthy, virtuous; but the applying of these lofty compliments is the proof that it does not bring happiness, and is an attempt to compensate the deficiency.  There is a certain tendency, not very great as human nature is constituted, for justice to beget justice in return—­for social virtue on one side to procure it on the other