Ought there not to be a scale of steady increase in
the numbers whose opinions have been gained beforehand?
Let us say three or four for an assembly of five-and-twenty,
six for fifty, ten or fifteen for a hundred, forty
for six hundred. It is permissible, no doubt,
to bring before a public body resolutions that there
is no immediate chance of carrying; what is termed
“ventilating” an opinion is a recognized
usage, and is not to be prohibited. But when
business multiplies, and time is precious, a certain
check should be put upon the ventilating of views
that have as yet not got beyond one or two individuals;
the process of conversion by out-of-door agency should
have made some progress in order to justify an appeal
to the body in the regular course of business.
That the House of Commons should ever be occupied
by a debate, where the movers could not command more
than four or five votes, is apparently out of all
reason. The power of the individual is unduly
exalted at the expense of the collective body.
There are plenty of other opportunities of gaining
adherents to any proposal that has something to be
said for it; and these should be plied up to the point
of securing a certain minimum of concurrence, before
the ear of the House can be commanded. With a
body of six hundred and fifty, the number of previously
obtained adherents would not be extravagantly high,
if it were fixed at forty. Yet considering that
the current business, in large assemblies, is carried
on by perhaps one-third or one-fourth of the whole,
and that the quorum in the House of Commons is such
as to make it possible for twenty-one votes to carry
a decision of the House, there would be an inconsistency
in requiring more than twenty names to back every
bill and every resolution and amendment that churned
to be discussed. Now I can hardly imagine restriction
upon the liberty of individual members more defensible
than this. If it were impossible to find any
other access to the minds of individual members than
by speeches in the House, or if all other modes of
conversion to new views were difficult and inefficient
in comparison, then we should say that the time of
the House must be taxed for the ventilating process.
Nothing of the kind, however, can be maintained.
Moreover, although the House may be obliged to listen
to a speech for a proposal that has merely half a
dozen of known supporters, yet, whenever this is understood
to be the case, scarcely any one will be at the trouble
of counter-arguing it, and the question really makes
no way; the mover is looked upon as a bore, and the
House is impatient for the extinguisher of a division.
The securing of twenty names would cost nothing to
the Government, or to any of the parties or sections
that make up the House: an individual standing
alone should be made to work privately, until he has
secured his backing of nineteen more names, and the
exercise would be most wholesome as a preparation
for convincing a majority of the House.