In the first place, the process of restraining discussion by penal tests is inherently untenable, absurd, and fallacious.

In support of this strong assertion, we have only to repeat, that every man has an interest in getting at the truth, and consequently in whatever promotes that end.  We live by the truth; error is death.  To stand between a man and the attainment of truth, is to inflict an injury of incalculable amount.  The circumstances wherein the prohibition of truth is desirable, must be extraordinary and altogether exceptional.  The few may have a self-interest in withholding truth from the many; neither the few nor the many have an interest in its being withheld from themselves.  Each one of us has the most direct concern in knowing on what plan this universe is constituted, what are its exact arrangements and laws.  Whether for the present life, or for any other life, we must steer our course by our knowledge, and that knowledge needs to be true.  Obstruction to the truth recoils upon the obstructors.  To flee to the refuge of lies is not the greatest happiness of anybody.

It has been maintained that there are illusions so beneficial as to be preferable to truth.  Occasionally, in private life, we practise little deceptions upon individuals when the truth would cause some great temporary mischief.  This case need not be discussed.  The important instance is in reference to religious belief.  A benevolent Deity and a future life are so cheering and consoling, it is said, that they should be secured against challenge or criticism; they ought not to be weakened by discussion.  This, of course, assumes that these doctrines are unable to maintain themselves against opponents, that, with all their intrinsic charm (which nobody can be indifferent to), they would give way under a free handling.  Such a confession is fatal.  Men will go on cherishing pleasing illusions, but not such as need to be protected in order to exist.  According to Plato, the belief in the goodness of the Deity was of so great importance that it was to be maintained by state penalties—­about the worst way of making the belief efficacious for its end.  What should we think of an Act passed to imprison whoever disputed the goodness of King Alfred, the Man of Ross, or Howard?

Granting that certain illusions are highly beneficial, it does not follow that they are to be exempted from criticism.  Their effect depends on the prestige of their truth.  That is, they must have reasons on their side.  But a doctrine is not supported by reasons, unless the objections are stated and answered; not sham objections, but the real difficulties of an enquiring mind.  If the statement of such difficulties is forcibly suppressed, the rational foundations will sooner or later be sapped.

[FREEDOM ESSENTIAL TO THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH.]

If illusions are themselves good, freedom of thought will give us the best.  Why should we protect inferior illusions against the discovery of the superior?  The unfettered march of the intellect may improve the quality of our illusions as illusions, while also strengthening their foundations.  If religion be a good thing, the best religion is the best thing; and we cannot be sure of having the best, if men are forbidden to make a search.