Cleinias:  We must not, Stranger, by the God of strangers I swear that we must not, for in our opinion you speak most truly; but we should like to know how you will accomplish your purpose.

Athenian:  Wait a little before you ask; and let us, first of all, be quite agreed with one another that the purpose has to be accomplished.

Cleinias:  Certainly, it ought to be, if it can be.

Athenian:  Well, and about the good and the honourable, are we to take the same view?  Are our guardians only to know that each of them is many, or also how and in what way they are one?

Cleinias:  They must consider also in what sense they are one.

Athenian:  And are they to consider only, and to be unable to set forth what they think?

Cleinias:  Certainly not; that would be the state of a slave.

Athenian:  And may not the same be said of all good things—­that the true guardians of the laws ought to know the truth about them, and to be able to interpret them in words, and carry them out in action, judging of what is and of what is not well, according to nature?

Cleinias:  Certainly.

Athenian:  Is not the knowledge of the Gods which we have set forth with so much zeal one of the noblest sorts of knowledge—­to know that they are, and know how great is their power, as far as in man lies?  We do indeed excuse the mass of the citizens, who only follow the voice of the laws, but we refuse to admit as guardians any who do not labour to obtain every possible evidence that there is respecting the Gods; our city is forbidden and not allowed to choose as a guardian of the law, or to place in the select order of virtue, him who is not an inspired man, and has not laboured at these things.

Cleinias:  It is certainly just, as you say, that he who is indolent about such matters or incapable should be rejected, and that things honourable should be put away from him.

Athenian:  Are we assured that there are two things which lead men to believe in the Gods, as we have already stated?

Cleinias:  What are they?

Athenian:  One is the argument about the soul, which has been already mentioned—­that it is the eldest and most divine of all things, to which motion attaining generation gives perpetual existence; the other was an argument from the order of the motion of the stars, and of all things under the dominion of the mind which ordered the universe.  If a man look upon the world not lightly or ignorantly, there was never any one so godless who did not experience an effect opposite to that which the many imagine.  For they think that those who handle these matters by the help of astronomy, and the accompanying arts of demonstration, may become godless, because they see, as far as they can see, things happening by necessity, and not by an intelligent will accomplishing good.