Cleinias:  Quite so.

Athenian:  There is no difficulty in seeing in what way the two differ from one another, and have received two names, and so of the rest.  But there is more difficulty in explaining why we call these two and the rest of them by the single name of virtue.

Cleinias:  How do you mean?

Athenian:  I have no difficulty in explaining what I mean.  Let us distribute the subject into questions and answers.

Cleinias:  Once more, what do you mean?

Athenian:  Ask me what is that one thing which I call virtue, and then again speak of as two, one part being courage and the other wisdom.  I will tell you how that occurs:  One of them has to do with fear; in this the beasts also participate, and quite young children—­I mean courage; for a courageous temper is a gift of nature and not of reason.  But without reason there never has been, or is, or will be a wise and understanding soul; it is of a different nature.

Cleinias:  That is true.

Athenian:  I have now told you in what way the two are different, and do you in return tell me in what way they are one and the same.  Suppose that I ask you in what way the four are one, and when you have answered me, you will have a right to ask of me in return in what way they are four; and then let us proceed to enquire whether in the case of things which have a name and also a definition to them, true knowledge consists in knowing the name only and not the definition.  Can he who is good for anything be ignorant of all this without discredit where great and glorious truths are concerned?

Cleinias:  I suppose not.

Athenian:  And is there anything greater to the legislator and the guardian of the law, and to him who thinks that he excels all other men in virtue, and has won the palm of excellence, than these very qualities of which we are now speaking—­courage, temperance, wisdom, justice?

Cleinias:  How can there be anything greater?

Athenian:  And ought not the interpreters, the teachers, the lawgivers, the guardians of the other citizens, to excel the rest of mankind, and perfectly to show him who desires to learn and know or whose evil actions require to be punished and reproved, what is the nature of virtue and vice?  Or shall some poet who has found his way into the city, or some chance person who pretends to be an instructor of youth, show himself to be better than him who has won the prize for every virtue?  And can we wonder that when the guardians are not adequate in speech or action, and have no adequate knowledge of virtue, the city being unguarded should experience the common fate of cities in our day?

Cleinias:  Wonder! no.

Athenian:  Well, then, must we do as we said?  Or can we give our guardians a more precise knowledge of virtue in speech and action than the many have? or is there any way in which our city can be made to resemble the head and senses of rational beings because possessing such a guardian power?